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Abstract
Research in cognitive ageing has found that while older adults show reductions in
performance on standard explicit memory tasks, implicit memory performance remains
relatively stable. Such findings are often used to support the popular dual-systems account
of human learning and memory, which organizes these types of cognition into distinct
implicit and explicit systems. In contrast to previous studies, we found that healthy older
adults show learning impairments on an implicit contextual cuing task when compared to
younger adults, in addition to expected poor performance on an explicit generation test. To
examine the possibility that slower overall response speed may account for the implicit
deficit, younger adults’ response times were artificially increased by altering the display
properties so as to match those of older adults. Learning in younger participants remained
intact under these conditions. Similarly, when display properties were altered to produce
faster responses in older participants, their learning continued to be impaired. These results
reveal that implicit processing is not immune to the effects of ageing, and that these deficits
cannot be attributed solely to older adults’ slower overall response speed.
In a further series of experiments using younger participants, we examined the
claim that implicit knowledge is not accessible to awareness in contextual cuing. When the
number of trials used in an explicit generation test was increased, we found that contextual
cuing information was consciously retrievable. These results suggest that the shorter tests
used previously were not statistically powerful enough to detect a true effect. Furthermore,
when concurrent implicit and explicit tests were used, learning did not precede awareness.
Collectively, these findings suggest that awareness may be a necessary concomitant of4
contextual cuing in older adults, and provide further evidence that learning and memory
should not be divided on the basis of consciousness.5
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1 Ageing and Implicit Learning
With the proportion of the global population over the age of 65 expected to increase
from 8% in 2008 to 24% by 2050 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004) it comes as no surprise that
scientific focus has become heavily concentrated on providing a clear picture of how the
mind succumbs to the effects of time. Although the prevention of more obvious physical
hallmarks of getting older like impaired hearing, vision, and motor skills have always been
a concern, the increased prevalence of debilitating neurological diseases like Alzheimer’s
disease and Mild Cognitive Impairment have made memory loss one of the most prominent
topics in ageing research. Research has shown that even the healthiest older adults show
reductions in performance on tasks of attentional capacity (Levitt, Fugelsang, & Crossley,
2006), working memory (Fristoe, Salthouse, & Woodward, 1997; Hasher & Zacks, 1988;
Salthouse & Prill, 1987; Salthouse, Mitchell, Skovronek, & Babcock, 1989) and episodic
memory (Balota, Dolan, & Duchek, 2000; Spencer & Raz, 1995) in relation to younger
adults. In contrast, it has been suggested that performance on tests of implicit memory,
such as repetition priming (Light & Singh, 1987; Light, La Voie, & Kennison, 1995;
Moscovitch, 1982; Prull, 2004), word-stem completion (Dick, Kean, & Sands, 1989;
Jelicic, Craik, & Moscovitch, 1996; Light & Singh, 1987; Mitchell & Bruss, 2003), and
artificial grammar learning (McGeorge, Crawford, & Kelly, 1997; Midford & Kirsner,
2005), remains relatively stable with age. This has led some theorists to the striking
hypothesis that implicit processing is immune to the effects of cognitive ageing
(Fleischman & Gabrieli, 1998; Fleischman Gabrieli, Wilson, Moro, & Bennett, 2005; JavaChapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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& Gardiner, 1991; Light, Singh, & Capps, 1986; Mitchell & Bruss, 2003; Prull, Gabrieli, &
Bunge, 2000).
In addition to providing optimistic views of aspects of ageing and cognition,
findings of spared implicit memory in older adults have also been used to validate the
popular dual-systems account of human learning and memory, which organizes these types
of cognition on the basis of consciousness. According to the dual-systems framework, the
implicit system not only processes information unintentionally and automatically, i.e., in
the absence of strategy or motivation and outside the bounds of attentional allocation; but
more intriguingly, also operates independent from, and processes content that is not
accessible to, conscious awareness (Squire, 1992). Therefore, results of intact implicit
processing despite explicit memory impairments in healthy older populations are seen as
crucial experimental evidence, akin to the dissociations obtained in amnesic patient
populations, for the existence of separate implicit and explicit memory systems.
Yet some scepticism has arisen of both results of amnesic memory dissociations
(Kinder & Shanks, 2001; 2003; Ostergaard, 1999; Reder, Park, & Kieffaber, 2009; Shanks,
Channon, Wilkinson, & Curran, 2006) and findings of age-related invariance on implicit
tasks (Rybash, 1996; Salthouse, McGuthry, & Zambrick 1999), which suggest that these
results may not necessarily reflect spared implicit abilities in either of these populations.
Claims of a pure and resilient implicit processing system (Daselaar, Rombouts, Veltman,
Raaijmakers, & Jonker, 2003; Luo & Craik, 2008; Prull et al., 2000; Reber, 1992) break
down even further when we consider that many re-examinations of these findings have
been unable to replicate original results of spared implicit memory in older adultsChapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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(Chiarello & Hoyer, 1988; Curran 1997; Fleischman et al., 2005; Howard, 1988; Howard &
Howard, 1997; Hultsch, Masson, & Small, 1991; La Voie & Light, 1994).
Howard, Howard, Dennis, and Yancovich (2004) compared healthy older and
younger adults’ performance on an implicit sequence learning paradigm proposed by
Nissen and Bullemer (1987) called the Serial Reaction Time task (SRT). Howard et al.
(2004) found evidence to suggest that older adults did not perform at the same level as
younger adults in the SRT task. Yet the authors attributed this result to the questionable
purity of the implicit processing driven by the SRT task, while maintaining that results of
equivalent implicit performance in the same older and younger participants using a
contextual cuing task (Chun & Jiang, 1998) reflected the true stability of implicit memory
in an ageing population. This conclusion is encouraging in the context of the negative
outlook usually associated with cognitive ageing; however, it may not be entirely accurate
given that the performance dissociation that is critical to this claim becomes questionable
when age-constancy in contextual cuing is examined in more detail. This thesis will
critically evaluate the conclusion of Howard et al. (2004), that contextual cuing is immune
to the effects of cognitive ageing, by examining age-related differences in the onset of
learning, response speed, and explicit memory in contextual cuing.
1.1 Known Effects of Cognitive Ageing
When exactly does cognitive decline begin? Early longitudinal examinations of
cognitive functioning by Thorndike, Bergman, Tilton, and Woodyard (1928) and Jones and
Conrad (1933) argued that our mental faculties actually improved into middle-age, and the
onset of mental debilitation was both sudden and very late in life (Salthouse, 2009). The
recent advent of neuroimageing techniques have been invaluable in allowing psychology toChapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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connect the noticeable behavioural consequences of ageing with in vivo age-related
changes to the structural integrity and architecture of the brain. Subsequent evidence from
functional neuroimageing and behavioural studies presents the occurrence of neural
deterioration and lower mental capacity on a continuum, rather than occurring suddenly as
previously thought, which begins in early adulthood but declines much more steeply after
the age of 50 (Dennis & Cabeza, 2008; Raz, 2005; Raz & Rodrigue, 2006). These changes
make many aspects of information processing difficult, including lower working memory
capacity, impaired episodic memory, and slower processing speed in older adults. In
contrast, other aspects of cognitive functioning like implicit memory have been thought of
as resistant to these changes (Schacter, Valdiserri, & Cooper, 1992).
1.1.1 Slower Processing Speed
Although volumetric shrinkage rates in the cerebral cortex as a whole are of
common interest, at 0.12% and 0.35% per year for younger and older adults respectively
(Raz, 2005), white matter health in the ageing brain is also a relevant concern. Even in
healthy older adults, the structural integrity of white matter in the brain significantly
declines to form what are known as white matter hyperintensities (WMH). The frontal and
occipital lobes see the largest increase in WMH volume in the brain (Brickman et al. 2005;
DeCarli et al, 1995; Raz et al., 1997; Tisserand et al. 2002). The main implications of
WMH are demyelination, (the breakdown of the myelin sheath that helps efficient
transmission of neural signals) (Meier-Ruge, Ulrich, Brühlmann, & Meier, 1992), and
myelin redundancy (a response of increased myelin production to compensate for myelin
breakdown that results in malformed splitting tissue) (Peters, Sethares, & Killiany, 2001).Chapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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Both of these processes have a deleterious effect on signal conduction, translating
behaviourally into slower neural signal transmission.
An obvious consequence of this lag in neural processing, known as cognitive
slowing, is the consistently slower response times of older adults on speeded tasks. Some
research has implicated inefficient signal transmission as preventing new associations from
forming (MacKay & Burke, 1990), or as the cause of retrieval failures, which lead to tip of
the tongue occurrences (Brown & Nix, 1996), and increased incidences of false memory
(Chan & McDermott, 2007) in older adults. Most notably, Processing-Speed Theory
(Salthouse, 1985; 1996) seeks to account for most age-related declines in cognitive
functioning in terms of cognitive slowing.
Processing-Speed Theory is dominated by this central concept: the slower rate of
processing in older adults constrains the quantity of knowledge that can be encoded,
leading to lower quality informational traces, and ultimately, age-related performance
impairments on a range of cognitive tasks. A further two main principles delineate exactly
how cognitive slowing inhibits information intake. The first, known as the limited time
mechanism, supposes that when processing speed is diminished, the execution of early
basic cognitive operations takes longer, leaving less time available for the completion of
later operations, and resulting in an incomplete representation of the relevant information.
According to the second principle, the simultaneity mechanism, longer execution of
operations not only creates greater demand for the simultaneous preservation of products of
earlier operations and relevant peripheral information from decay as a function of time; but
also, makes it more difficult to perform tasks concurrently. Ultimately, this results in the
loss or degradation of earlier information by the time later processing has finished.Chapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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This view is supported by evidence that processing speed declines steadily with age.
An early study of this phenomenon by Miles (1931) measured participants’ speed in
detecting a buzzing sound using a morse key, and observed pronounced slowness in
participants over 60 years old. Since then, studies have become more sophisticated in
measuring this construct, but have consistently replicated this finding (Birren & Botwinick,
1955; Birren & Morrison, 1961; Cerella, 1985; Craik & Rabinowitz, 1985; Eriksen,
Hamlin, & Daye, 1973; Fisk & Rogers, 1991; Griew, 1959; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Rabbitt,
1964; Salthouse, 1978; 1980; Simon, 1968).
Structural equation modelling (Salthouse, 2001) and similar statistical techniques
provide further support for the idea by showing that processing speed is a consistently
strong mediator of cognitive decline. Standardised measures of processing speed include
the digit symbol substitution task, a simple exercise requiring participants to use a pre-
determined code of symbols to digits to fill in a worksheet containing only digits with the
appropriate symbols as rapidly as possible. To examine the amount of attenuation in age-
related variance for a given cognitive task when participants’ processing speed has been
statistically controlled for, many studies have related low-level measures of processing
speed to the performance of older adults on a variety of cognitive tasks (e.g., counting
tasks, Sliwinski, 1997; Stroop, Uttl, & Graf, 1997; memory span, Cowan, Wood, Wood,
Keller, Nugent, & Keller, 1997; Kail & Park, 1994; task switching, Salthouse, Fristoe,
McGuthry, & Hambrick, 1998).
In particular, Fristoe et al. (1997) analysed age differences that resulted from
performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) in relation to working memory
and processing speed. Fristoe et al. were able to determine that older adults were notChapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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utilizing the feedback of responses in the task as effectively as younger adults.
Interestingly, when perceptual speed measures were included in hierarchical regression
analyses of working memory and feedback usage on WCST performance, controlling for
all 3 variables resulted in 91.7% attenuation of age-related WCST performance differences.
Further regressions revealed that differences in working memory and feedback usage in
older and younger adults were mediated by corresponding differences in processing speed.
The parsimony of the processing speed argument has great appeal, in that it replaces earlier
more task-specific theories of age-related impairments with a simple single mechanism
approach to cognitive ageing.
1.1.2 Explicit Memory Impairments
Another by-product of growing older is memory decline. Older people experience
difficulties on episodic memory tasks (McIntyre & Craik, 1987; Schacter, Kaszniak,
Kihlstrom, & Valdiserri, 1991), which involve remembering specific autobiographical
events and often contain a spatial and temporal context. Working memory, also known as
short-term memory, is the ability to temporarily retain relevant knowledge for later use.
Older people also show much lower working memory capacity in comparison to younger
adults (Craik & Jennings, 1992; Dobbs & Rule, 1989; Hartman, Bolton, & Fehnel, 2001;
Salthouse & Babcock, 1991). Episodic and working memory are mediated by explicit
processing, since information contained in both of these memory stores is intentionally
acquired and consciously retrievable.
As described in the previous section, some accounts of cognitive ageing suppose
that slower processing speed is the mechanism for these memory deficits; however, there
are other arguments to suggest that a loss of inhibitory control (Hasher & Zacks, 1988), orChapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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declining sensory functioning (Lindenberger & Baltes, 1994) occurring with age may be
additional or alternative explanations for age-related impairments.
Hasher and Zacks (1988) proposed that working memory capacity may not actually
diminish in older adults; instead declines in performance in these tasks may be a
consequence of an inefficient filtering mechanism. Therefore, older adults may still be able
to retain the same quantity of information, but diminished inhibitory processes make the
contents of their working memory stores particularly susceptible to irrelevant information.
This “mental clutter” interferes with processing of relevant information, and ultimately
leads to cognitive failures and slower responding on memory tasks (Zacks, Hasher, & Li,
2000). Studies using the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), where inhibition of the word while
naming the perceptual features is crucial to performance (i.e., the word “green” appearing
in the colour blue), have shown that the magnitude of interference caused by irrelevant
perceptual features is greater in older adults (Cohn, Dustman, & Bradford, 1984;
Langenecker, Nielson, & Rao, 2004), and does not diminish with prolonged practice as it
does in younger adults (Davidson, Zacks, & Williams, 2003). Perhaps the most convincing
evidence of inhibitory decline, because it occurs with such a low-level response, are recent
findings by Butler and Zacks (2006) showing that older adults were not as efficient at
inhibiting prepotent eye movement responses to irrelevant peripheral distracter cues as
younger adults.
In contrast, the Sensory Deficit Theory proposes a basic link between sensory
functions and cognitive processing, suggesting that the loss of visual and auditory
functioning that occurs with age has particularly deleterious effects on the intake of
information (Lindenberger & Ghisletta, 2009). Using a similar approach to SalthouseChapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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(1996) with processing speed, Lindenberger and Baltes (1994) have shown that strong
relationships exist between visual and auditory acuity in older adults and their performance
on a battery of cognitive tests, including several tests of explicit memory, and argue that
these factors are more powerful predictors of performance than processing speed measures
like the digital symbol substitution task.
1.2 The Implicit-Explicit Memory Distinction
There has been an accumulation of research over the past 30 or so years which
appears to suggest that human learning and memory are organized into at least two distinct
systems, one of which is explicit or declarative and one of which is implicit or procedural.
The former system allows conscious recall of facts or events while the latter influences
performance unconsciously (Squire, 1992). Central to this systems view of learning and
memory is a very large body of evidence that the implicit system can be isolated in
appropriate preparations: that is to say, in tasks where learning proceeds independently of
the individual’s awareness of the learned properties of the materials. Such ‘implicit
learning’ tasks – which have been studied for many decades (Thorndike, 1931) – therefore
have an important reciprocal relationship to memory systems theories.
Despite the enormous number of studies attempting to demonstrate implicit
learning, it is fair to say that these have been consistently dogged by controversy. A
common cycle of research begins with a new and apparently compelling instance of
implicit learning, only for this instance to be undermined and challenged by later research.
Examples include Thorndike’s own studies of verbal operant conditioning (Dulany, 1961),
Reber’s artificial grammar experiments (Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey, 1984), learning in theChapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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Iowa Gambling Task (Maia & McClelland, 2004), studies of human conditioning
(Lovibond & Shanks, 2002), and studies of reaction times to sequentially-structured stimuli
(Perruchet & Amorim, 1992).
1.2.1 Evidence from Tests of Awareness
Dual-systems theories of memory organization rely heavily on empirical evidence
of dissociations between direct (explicit) and indirect (implicit) measures of knowledge.
The rationale is that a purely implicit processing mechanism is demonstrated when the
possession of knowledge is expressed on an indirect measure (such as RT), but the same
knowledge is not consciously retrievable when assessed on a direct measure of learning
(such as prediction, recognition).
Although superficially these results of dissociations between direct and indirect
measures of learning seem to demonstrate that the dual-systems perspective is valid in its
partitioning of memory according to awareness at learning, a number of methodological
problems have been raised against previous dissociations of this sort (Shanks & St. John,
1994). Often when these problems are rectified, the finding of implicit learning without
explicit access is not replicated (Shanks & Johnstone, 1999; Shanks & Perruchet, 2002).
One such issue relates to the power and reliability of the awareness test. The modal
implicit learning finding is of above-chance performance on an indirect test such as
contextual cuing, together with chance performance on an explicit test. Plainly, this means
that the inference of implicit learning rests on a null result in the awareness test, and the
interpretation of such a null result depends critically on that test’s power and reliability. Yet
these awareness tests are rarely set up in such a way as to guarantee adequate
power/reliability. Although implicit measures are often made up of many hundreds of trials,Chapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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awareness tests usually only contain a single presentation of learned stimuli. An ‘awareness
effect’ would have to be very large to be reliably detected in such a small number of trials.
This concern poses a problem to dual-systems arguments when one considers that null
effects on explicit tests obtained by past experiments may merely be a product of using
statistically weak measures, rather than a genuine illustration of a dissociation between
implicit and explicit memory systems.
Additional criticisms outlined by Shanks and St. John (1994) of these behavioural
dissociations between learning and awareness call further attention to the importance of
experimental rigor in explicit tests. Namely, these authors proposed two requirements that
experimenters should adhere to when designing awareness measures in order for results to
be considered as valid evidence of a dual-systems theory of learning and memory.
First, a measure of awareness must be sensitive to all of the conscious information
the participant has acquired in the task, i.e., the explicit test should be exhaustive (Shanks
& St. John, 1994). Under this ‘sensitivity criterion’, measures of awareness based on verbal
report are deemed unsuitable. Not only is it common for participants to be unable to
verbalize knowledge of learned information (Reber, 1967), but the subjectivity of such a
test of awareness may also make participants more likely to report only conscious
information held with moderately high confidence (Kunimoto, Miller, & Pashler, 2001).
When this is the case, dissociations between performance on an implicit task measuring RT
and awareness measured using verbal report may be indicative of the insensitivity of the
awareness test, rather than a true display that knowledge that is inaccessible to
consciousness.Chapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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Second, Shanks and St. John (1994) proposed the ‘information criterion’, which
says that measures of awareness should probe for the same information that supports
performance on the implicit task. For instance, Greenspoon (1955) demonstrated that
participants could be conditioned by the experimenter to produce a specific response, in
this case plural nouns, when asked to randomly generate words. The positive reinforcement
contingency used in this study was simply the experimenter saying ‘umhmm’ after a
participant responded with a plural noun, and produced the desired outcome of a higher
frequency of plural nouns in participants. This seemed to be a demonstration of learning
without awareness, since participants who learned this association appeared to be unable to
accurately report knowledge of this association between experimenter feedback and their
own responses. However, a follow-up interpretation of this study by Dulany (1961) showed
that Greenspoon was mistaken in only assigning awareness to participants who reported the
contingency the experimenter implanted specifically. Another rule commonly reported by
participants (following a word with another in the same semantic category would lead to
reinforcement) also produced the desired pattern of saying a plural noun (apples) reliably
followed by another plural noun response (bananas). Consequently, Dulany (1961)
concluded that participants in Greenspoon (1955) actually did display conscious awareness
of the rule that governed their implicit behaviour.
Another violation of the information criterion is evident in a demonstration of
implicit sequence knowledge by Willingham, Nissen, and Bullemer (1989). In an SRT task
a dot stimulus appears at 1 of 4 locations on the screen on each trial, and participants are
asked to press a button corresponding to the location of dot on the screen as quickly as
possible. Unbeknownst to participants, the locations of the dots across trials follow aChapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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predetermined 10-trial repeating sequence. Willingham et al. considered it an indication of
learning the repeated sequence when participants’ response times sped up with more
exposure to the sequence, as well as in relation to participants trained on a random
sequence. This knowledge was thought to be inaccessible to awareness, because
participants were unable to accurately generate the learned sequence on the explicit test.
However, Shanks, Green, and Kolodny (1994) hypothesised that, since the
probability of each dot location was not equal, participants’ response efficiency might
actually be mediated by learning the probability of a stimulus occurring at each location
and not knowledge of the sequence. Shanks et al. confirmed this by replicating Willingham
et al.’s result when a group of participants were trained on a pseudo-random sequence and
the frequency of each stimulus location was matched to the repeated sequence.
The ideas described above outline circumstances in which obtained dissociations
would provide strong evidence that learning and memory can be sufficiently partitioned
into distinct implicit and explicit processing components.
1.2.2 Evidence from Amnesic Populations
Some of the most persuasive evidence favouring distinct implicit and explicit
systems of memory comes from studies of amnesic patients. While these participants
perform poorly on tests of explicit memory, due to the nature of brain lesions linked to
amnesia, some have argued that their ability on tests of implicit memory is equivalent to
that of control participants. Early studies stumbled upon this finding when amnesic patients
were able to show normal word recall in relation to controls when they were given the
initial letters of the word as a cue (Mayes, Meudell, & Neary, 1978; Mortensen, 1980;Chapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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Squire, Wetzel, & Slater, 1978; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1970; 1974). A later experiment
by Graf, Squire, and Mandler (1984) showed that cued recall in amnesic patients was
indistinguishable from control participants when the instructions of the task were changed
to promote the use of implicit retrieval strategies (e.g., report the first word that comes to
mind) rather than explicit ones (recall words studied previously in the task). Since these
early studies, research has extended these results to encompass a variety of implicit tasks
such as repetition priming (Bowers & Schacter, 1993; Graf & Schacter, 1985; Hamann &
Squire, 1997; Schacter & Graf, 1986; Tulving & Schacter, 1990; Cermak, Talbot,
Chandler, & Wolbarst, 1985; Haist, Musen, & Squire, 1991) and artificial grammar
learning (Knowlton, Ramus, & Squire, 1992; Knowlton & Squire, 1994; 1996). These
dissociations are of considerable value to proponents of distinct implicit and explicit
memory systems, because they appear to provide evidence for the existence of a type of
memory that operates independently from conscious processing.
Conversely, there have been instances when amnesic patients do not show explicit
memory impairments (Huppert & Piercy, 1976; 1978), or spared implicit memory (Chun &
Phelps, 1999; Squire, Shimamura, & Graf, 1987). Ostergaard and Jernigan (1993) attribute
these mixed results to the low reliability and power of most implicit memory measures to
detect underlying between-groups differences, and propose that researchers should not
present null between-groups effects as unambiguous proof that implicit processing is
spared in amnesic populations. Ostergaard (1999) even questioned whether the original
results from early word-stem completion studies (Milner, 1968; Warrington & Weiskrantz,
1968; Weiskrantz & Warrington, 1970) support the idea that priming is spared in amnesia,
since improved retention performance with the induction of word fragment cues in amnesicChapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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participants was usually still significantly lower than the control group in these early
studies.
Other research has drawn attention to the validity of obtained dissociations as
evidence of a memory distinction. Demonstrations of some ability to learn on an implicit
test occurring in the presence of poor performance on an explicit test can be based on a
single memory trace, i.e., mediated by a unitary memory system (Kinder & Shanks, 2001;
2003; Nosofsky, & Zaki, 1998; Speekenbrink, Channon, & Shanks, 2008). Using a
generalized context model that adjusted a memory sensitivity parameter based on the
amnesic patients’ inherently impaired storage of exemplars, Nosofsky and Zaki (1998)
reproduced the dissociation shown by Knowlton and Squire (1993) of implicit
categorization of visual dot patterns without subsequent awareness on a recognition task
using a single storage exemplar process to support performance on both the categorization
and recognition tasks in their model.
Kinder and Shanks (2001) successfully simulated the results obtained by Knowlton
et al. (1992), which showed intact implicit classification without explicit recognition in an
artificial grammar learning task in an amnesic population, using a single process recurrent
network (SRN) model that assumed a reduced learning rate in the amnesic population. The
SRN model was also able to reproduce results from Knowlton and Squire (1996) showing
poor recognition in amnesic patients for chunks of grammar sequences and intact
classification ability in relation to control participants. Moreover, in Kinder and Shanks
(2001) the SRN model was also extended to predict intact repetition priming without
significant recognition ability shown in studies of amnesic patients (Hamann & Squire,
1997a; 1997b). The results of that simulation implicated inherent differences betweenChapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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priming and recognition tasks as the source of these performance dissociations rather than
distinct memory processes. Similarly, in their final study Kinder and Shanks demonstrated
that impaired priming accompanied by intact recognition in a patient with lesions to the
occipital lobe in Gabrieli, Fleischman, Keane, Reminger, and Morrell (1995) was not a
consequence of an implicit memory impairment, but instead was mediated by a visual
processing deficit.
A further study by Speekenbrink et al. (2008) applied a dynamic lens model to
results from amnesic patients on a weather prediction task, which is a probabilistic category
learning task requiring participants to use a rule to predict outcomes based on a set of cues
and then assign probabilistic weights to each cue as a means of explicitly reporting task
knowledge. This study found that learning shown via prediction performance was
equivalent between amnesic and control participants, and more importantly showed that
prediction performance and later task knowledge were related. Neither of these results is
predicted by a multiple-systems model of memory.
The success of these simulations using single system models contradicts the idea of
a selective explicit memory impairment in amnesic patients, and suggests that a general
memory deficit is present that affects both explicit and implicit memory.
1.2.3 Evidence from Older Populations
Demonstrations of age invariant performance on an implicit memory task are often
viewed as evidence in favour of distinct implicit and explicit mechanisms of learning and
memory. The logic of these types of behavioural dissociations is that implicit memory
proceeds normally in older populations because only cognitive functioning mediated by
conscious processing is susceptible to age-related deterioration.Chapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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Although there is a vast amount of the literature suggesting that healthy older adults
do not perform any differently from younger adults on tasks supported by implicit memory
(Knopman & Nissen, 1987; Light & Albertson, 1989; McGeorge et al., 1997), there is at
the same time a considerable body of evidence showing implicit memory impairments in
older adults (Abbenhuis, Raaijmakers, Raaijmakers, & van Woerden, 1990; Cherry &
Stadler, 1995; Chiarello & Hoyer, 1988; Howard, 1988; La Voie & Light, 1994; Light &
Singh, 1987).
Salthouse et al. (1999) proposed that results statistically different from chance in
older and younger participants reported in many papers may be indicative of the inherent
lack of reliability in typical implicit task measures, rather than evidence that implicit
abilities remain intact with advanced age. That is to say, even if a finding of equivalent
implicit performance has been empirically established, the measures that make up the
phenomenon may still reflect inconsistent data on the individual level. Moreover, a lack of
an effect could be an artefact of low reliability rather than an indication of behavioural
equivalence. By testing a large group of participants (n = 183) ranging in age from 18 to
87 years old using an extensive range of standardized measures of explicit memory,
processing speed, and implicit memory, Salthouse et al. (1999) found data to suggest that
certain implicit memory tests (i.e., artificial grammar or associative learning tasks) are not
reliable enough for investigating individual differences. The only implicit task with the
appropriate level of reliability to detect age-related differences in performance, according
to Salthouse et al. (1999), is the SRT task.
Early studies using the SRT task found that older adults were capable of showing
sequence learning (Knopman & Nissen, 1987; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987); however, theseChapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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studies did not employ tests of awareness so Howard and Howard (1989, 1992) re-
examined sequence learning in an older population with direct comparison to a younger
population and using varying lengths of sequences. Both studies found no difference in
implicit sequence learning by age. Sequence length also negatively affected learning to the
same extent in each age group, but the older adults were markedly worse than younger
adults on the awareness test in the longer 16- and 20-element sequences, which asked
participants to predict elements of the sequence at certain intervals.
In contrast, other examinations of the SRT task in ageing populations have found
evidence of age-related deficits in performance (Cherry & Stadler, 1995; Curran, 1997;
Curran, Smith, DiFranco, & Daggy, 2001; Feeney, Howard, & Howard, 2002; Howard &
Howard, 1997; Howard & Howard, 2001; Howard et al. 2004; Jackson & Jackson, 1992)
when the sequences employed higher-order predictive relationships. Curran (1997)
reasoned that older adults’ sequence learning deficits may become more evident when
sequences possess more complex relationships, grounding this explanation in recurrent-
network models of sequence learning (Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991; Keele & Jennings,
1992). Because working memory capacity diminishes with age, it may be more difficult for
larger chunks of sequence knowledge to retain predictive value. Other explanations of
deficits also tend to explain age-related sequence learning impairments in terms of the
general memory decrements older people have been shown to experience (Cherry &
Stadler, 1995; Feeney et al, 2002; Howard et al., 2004).
The majority of criticisms of implicit memory research in older populations argue
that a general memory impairment is the mechanism of age-related deficits in these sorts ofChapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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tasks, which also lends support for the perspective that memory should not be defined on
the basis of consciousness at processing (Reder et al. 2009).
1.3 The Spatial Contextual Cuing Paradigm
Chun and colleagues reported results from studies using a spatial contextual cuing
paradigm (Chun & Jiang, 1998). Whereas most implicit learning and memory tasks are
concerned with adaptations in the way in which words or objects are processed, contextual
cuing relates to the no less important issue of scene learning. When we enter a familiar
room we do not search randomly for our coffee cup – predictive contextual cues guide our
search and attention to the most probable locations (e.g., the table). In contextual cuing,
participants learn associative relationships between repeating spatial layouts of distracter
letters and the location of a target stimulus in displays viewed during visual search.
Participants are shown displays containing a set of 12 letter stimuli and are required to
detect a target stimulus (a letter T) within the subset of distracter stimuli (11 letter L’s).
Crucially, the location of the target in half of the displays appears repeatedly with the same
arrangement of the distracters surrounding it. This learning is expressed through the
gradual development of search efficiency for these repeated displays, indicating that
repetitive exposure to these distracter configurations results in the acquisition of a mental
representation that becomes relied upon to guide search.
Contextual cuing is claimed to engage purely implicit processing because when
given a direct test of explicit knowledge – such as having to generate the location of a
missing target during a generation test (Bennett, Romano, Howard, & Howard, 2008;
Bennett, Barnes, Howard, & Howard, 2009; Chun & Jiang, 2003; Park et al., 2004) or
making a recognition judgment (Barnes et al. 2008; Chun & Jiang, 1998; 1999; Chun &Chapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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Phelps, 1999; Howard et al., 2004; Huang, 2006; Howard, Howard, Japikse, & Eden,
2006; Manns & Squire, 2001; Nabeta, Ono, Kauahara, 2003; Pollman & Manginelli, 2009;
Schankin & Schubo, 2009; van Asselen et al., 2009) – participants perform no better than
they would through random guessing (but see Brockmole & Henderson, 2006; Endo &
Takeda, 2005; Ono, Kauahara, & Jiang, 2005; Olson & Jiang, 2004; Olson et al. 2005; Ono
et al., 2005; Peterson, Kramer, & Colcombe, 2002; Preston & Gabrieli, 2008; Vaidya,
Huger, Howard, & Howard, 2007).
Further evidence that contextual cuing operates on an unconscious level was
demonstrated by Jiang and Leung (2005), who manipulated attention during learning.
Participants viewed displays with stimuli in 2 colours and were instructed to attend to a
certain colour of distracter stimuli and ignore the other colour throughout learning. A
contextual cuing effect emerged even for the unattended-colour distracters, which suggests
that contextual cuing is not contingent upon conscious attention to the relevant stimuli.
The findings described above support the notion that contextual cuing employs
strictly implicit processing that is fundamentally distinct from explicit memory. However,
Chun and Phelps (1999) found that amnesics with hippocampal and medial temporal lobe
damage show impaired contextual cuing, and concluded that this was a demonstration that
these memory structures were crucial to performance in the task. Similar results were
obtained by Ryan, Althoff, Whitlow, and Cohen (2000), who showed that an amnesic
population was unable to exploit cues when performing an analogous visual search task
with real-word images, leading these authors to conclude that amnesic patients possess a
binding deficit which may prevent formation of cue-layout associations in these types of
implicit tasks (but see Smith, Hopkins, & Squire, 2006). Park et al. (2004) also examinedChapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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contextual cuing in amnesia; however, this study utilized the drug midazolam to create
cases of “synthetic” anterograde amnesia in a group of control participants. This drug is
known to induce explicit memory impairments in normal healthy individuals, while leaving
implicit task performance unaffected (Arndt, Passannante, & Hirshman, 2004; Curran,
DeBuse, Woroch, & Hirshman, 2006; Thomas-Anterion, Koenig, Navez, & Laurent, 1999).
The synthetic amnesic participants in Park et al. (2004) did not demonstrate contextual
cuing, akin to findings in actual amnesic patients in Chun and Phelps (1999), while the
control group of participants, who received a dose of saline, showed contextual cuing but
no ability to recognize learned patterns on an awareness test. Collectively, these studies
converge on the idea that brain structures that are causally linked with the explicit memory
impairments experienced by amnesic patients, such as the hippocampus, may also be
involved in contextual cuing.
Recent neuroimageing data from Greene, Gross, Elsinger, and Rao (2007)
confirmed that the hippocampus was involved with contextual cuing, even when
recognition did not exceed chance (but see Preston & Gabrieli, 2008). Greene et al. (2007)
argued that activation of the hippocampus during performance signals that the processing
involved with encoding the complex associative relationships entailed in contextual cuing
can only proceed intentionally. Such a result also implies that a behavioural dissociation
between learning and awareness for a given piece of information may not necessarily
reflect its possession of a unique implicit property, but instead may indicate that this
information is represented at a lower level of quality or strength which makes it unable to
support performance on an explicit test (Shanks, 2005).Chapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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1.3.1 Age Invariant Contextual Cuing
In a series of experiments, Howard et al. (2004) examined sequential learning and
contextual cuing in a single group of healthy older participants, who exhibited typical
explicit memory impairments in relation to a group of younger control participants on
standardized measures of recall and working memory. The older adults failed to show
evidence of learning on a SRT task, yet their performance on a contextual cuing task
showed no difference from younger adults. Younger participants were able to wilfully
generate sequential information in the SRT task, demonstrating conscious awareness for the
knowledge learned, while subsequent contextual cuing ability was not accompanied by the
ability to recognize learned displays on a direct test of knowledge. Finding impaired SRT
performance in the presence of intact contextual cuing ability in older people was not only
taken as proof that explicit memory does not support contextual cuing, but also that purely
implicit processing is not affected by cognitive ageing.
The criticisms of implicit tasks put forth by Salthouse et al. (1999) also apply to
these experiments. Reaction times, as shown in older populations, are known to be highly
variable (Chapman, Chapman, Curran, & Miller, 1994), which could make it difficult for
an ANOVA to detect underlying performance differences. In fact, a graph of response
times from both groups in Howard et al.’s Experiment 1 across the contextual cuing task
shows that learning may have occurred in younger participants before older participants. A
difference in learning onset would imply that older adults might not have picked up on the
contextual information contained in repeated displays as quickly as younger adults did.
However, since Howard et al. (2004) did not include more detailed comparisons of task
performance, there are no means of determining when learning first occurred for eachChapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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participant group or if the magnitude of the contextual cuing effect by the end of the task
was equivalent.
The role of awareness in the analysis of these experiments also provokes some
concern. The direct test used in Howard et al. (2004) measured participants’ ability to
discriminate repeated displays shown throughout the visual search portion of the task from
completely novel displays (Chun & Jiang, 1998), which is neither the most powerful nor
the most sensitive test of awareness. Discrimination judgments are often supported by
familiarity or perceptual fluency (Jacoby, Kelley, Dywan, 1989; Whittlesea, Jacoby,
Girard, 1990), and in addition the recognition process in this sort of task does not engage
the same processes entailed by the visual search task where contextual cuing knowledge is
encoded (Shanks & St. John, 1994). Performance on such a test may not actually evoke the
same memory trace used to support a contextual cuing effect during the visual search task;
therefore, a null effect in recognition may not mean that contextual cuing knowledge is not
consciously retrievable. Chun and Jiang (2003) proposed a revised direct test, which
showed participants the repeated displays from the search task, but this time the target letter
they were supposed to search for was substituted with a distracter letter. Participants were
then asked to generate the location of the missing target letter, forcing them to localize the
target based on the spatial configuration of distracter letters in the display and providing a
closer match to the initial process that supported encoding of contextual cuing knowledge.
Given that Chun and Jiang (2003) rectified these methodological problems via the
generation test, it is unclear why Howard et al. (2004) decided to include a recognition test
as a means of gauging awareness.Chapter 1: Ageing and Implicit Learning
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Another relevant problem to consider in tests of explicit knowledge, as considered
in greater detail previously, is their statistical power (Buchner & Wippich, 2000). While the
visual search task contains many hundreds of trials to assess contextual cuing, the direct
tests traditionally included in contextual cuing experiments are made up of only 24 trials to
probe for conscious awareness. This disparity in the number of data points contributing to
each measure provokes some concern. We would expect lengthening an awareness test to
substantially increase the power of the explicit measure. It is therefore unclear whether
Howard et al. (2004) would have still obtained dissociable contextual cuing and recognition
performance if the explicit measure had included more trials.
The ideas described above offer some alternate interpretations of contextual cuing
in older adults, as well of the dissociations between learning and awareness in younger
adults found in Howard et al. (2004). This thesis aims to reconcile these issues by asking
whether older adults are able to show intact learning in this task, examining whether the
factors that contribute to contextual cuing are similar across older and younger adults, and
questioning if contextual cuing can occur independently from conscious awareness.37
2 Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
The experiment reported in this chapter looked at cognitive ageing in the setting of
implicit memory using a contextual cuing task (Chun & Jiang, 1998). The contextual cuing
learning effect is a relatively stable finding in younger adults (Chun & Jiang, 1998; Chun &
Jiang, 2003; Preston & Gabrieli, 2008; Smyth & Shanks, 2008); however, it is unclear how
performance is affected by the general age-related cognitive decrements that occur in
healthy older adults. As described in Chapter 1, contextual cuing was first examined in an
ageing population by Howard et al. (2004). Howard et al.’s (2004) main finding was that
older participants showed marked impairments in relation to younger controls on an SRT
task, but the same older individuals performed at a comparable level to a younger control
group on a contextual cuing task. These findings led Howard et al. (2004) to conclude that
the SRT and contextual cuing tasks rely upon distinct neurological structures that are
differentially affected by cognitive ageing.
The conclusion that age-constant learning occurred in the contextual cuing task was
based on rather weak evidence (i.e., a null result). Previous experiments in contextual cuing
have reported reliable learning in younger participants after as few as 12 blocks of trials in
the detection task (Chun & Jiang, 1998; 1999). A similar learning effect was apparent for
younger adults in Experiment 1 of Howard et al. (2004); however, a graph plotting each age
group’s RT data in each epoch of the task clearly showed that older adults developed
contextual cuing much later, after about 20 blocks of trials. Nevertheless, because the
ANOVA failed to show a three-way interaction with age, Howard et al. concluded that the
amount of response facilitation for repeating displays across the task was equivalent inChapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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older and younger participants. An alternative interpretation is that this null effect was due
to insufficient power in the ANOVA to detect the older group’s apparent underlying
contextual cuing deficit. The older adults as a group also showed efficient responding to the
repeated configurations when their data were analysed separately, an indication that
learning of these displays’ contextual layouts occurred. In fact, the only indication of an age
difference in performance, statistically, was the slower overall response speed of older
adults, which Howard et al. (2004) conjectured might have masked their performance
deficits.
In light of this, it is difficult to evaluate Howard et al.’s (2004) conclusion that
contextual cuing is age invariant. Instead, it seems important to re-examine the effects of
cognitive ageing in the contextual cuing paradigm to address the concern described above.
In Experiment 1, we examined the delayed emergence of contextual cuing in older in
relation to younger participants implied by the trend in Howard et al.’s (2004) data by
altering the length of the learning phase in the contextual cuing task.
2.1 Experiment 1
If older participants require more repetitions of the contextual cues before showing
learning, this deficit should become more apparent after a shorter task duration, prior to an
asymptotic level of learning being reached. In Experiment 1, we examined this possibility
by shortening the 30 block (6 epochs) detection task used by Howard et al. (2004) to
include only 16 blocks (4 epochs) of trials. Fewer blocks of trials should still produce
reliable contextual cuing in younger participants, but if older participants learn at a slower
rate than younger participants, as suggested by Howard et al.’s data, they should show little
sign of an effect with less exposure to the task.Chapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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2.1.1 Method
2.1.1.1 Participants
Twenty older adults ranging from 55 to 88 years old (M = 69.20, SD = 10.08) and
20 younger adults ranging from 19 to 30 years old (M = 23.40, SD = 3.14) volunteered to
participate in this study, and were paid a baseline incentive of £3 plus an additional 10
pence for every configuration identified correctly in the recognition task. Older participants
were recruited from a local senior community centre and the University College London
(UCL) participant database, while all younger participants were recruited from the UCL
participant database. The participant groups were matched for gender and education (Table
2.1). The older participants scored lower than younger participants on several sub-scales of
the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-III) (3
rd ed., Wechsler, 1997b), all t’s > 2.11, p’s < .05,
confirming performance decrements known to manifest themselves with age.
Table 2.1. Participant Demographics in Experiment 1
Younger Older
(n = 20) (n = 20)
Gender
Female 13 13
Male 7 7
Age M = 23.40 (3.14) M = 69.20* (10.08)
Education (years) M = 14.40 (1.27) M = 13.55 (2.39)
Memory
WMS-III Logical Memory I Recall M = 40.55 (13.19) M = 28.60* (11.10)
WMS-III Logical Memory II Recall M = 26.65 (9.58) M = 15.10* (8.14)
WMS-III Logical Memory Recognition M = 25.30 (2.70) M = 22.10* (6.23)
WMS-III Logical Memory Retention M = 81.9 (16.70) M = 59.50* (18.72)
Numbers in brackets denote standard deviations.
* p < .001Chapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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2.1.1.2 Design
The detection task was a 2 x 2 x 4 mixed-factorial design (Age Group x Repetition x
Epoch) with Age Group (Older and Younger) as a between-subjects variable, and
Repetition (Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations) and Epoch (1-4) manipulated
within-subjects. Each participant’s RT for detecting the target letter in the configuration of
distracters was measured on each search trial. A post-learning recognition task employed a
2 x 2 x 2 (Age Group x Repetition x Block) mixed-factorial design. Response accuracy in
discriminating configurations seen during the detection task from completely novel
configurations was measured in each block.
2.1.1.3 Materials and Apparatus
The detection and recognition tasks were modified versions of the contextual cuing
task described in Chun and Jiang (1998), and were programmed using Visual Basic
software to generate all stimuli and measure participant responses. On each trial, the
participant viewed a configuration of 11 letter-L distracters and 1 rotated letter-T target
against a grey background, and identified the orientation of the target letter (either left or
right) in the display as quickly as possible. A set of 12 Repeated configurations of letters
were presented in each block, while the remaining 12 trials in the block contained new
configurations that were shown only once during the task (Non-Repeated configurations).
A unique set of 12 Repeated and 192 Non-Repeated configurations were generated for each
participant, and the order of presentation of Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations
was randomised in each block.Chapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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Figure 2.1. An example display of letters seen by participants during the detection and
recognition tasks.
All letter stimuli appeared in 30 pt. Arial font at a visual angle of 0.76° at a viewing
distance of approximately 60 cm. The 21cm x 21cm screen was divided into an 8 x 8 grid
of possible locations, then subdivided into a 4 quadrant invisible matrix. Three letters
coloured red, green, yellow, or blue were then randomly assigned to a spatial location in
each quadrant, which resulted in each configuration containing 3 letters in each colour. The
spatial locations of the target letter Ts were evenly distributed across the 4 quadrants of the
screen within each block and configuration condition to control for location probability
effects. The locations of the target letter T in the Non-Repeated configurations shown in
each block were always chosen from the same set of 12 counterbalanced spatial locations
generated at the beginning of the task. Each T was rotated 90° to the right or left, and eachChapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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L was shown at 0°, 90°, 180°, or 270°. The location and colour of all letters in each
Repeated configuration were kept constant with each presentation, with the exception of the
varying and unpredictable orientation of the letter T: the location, but not the orientation, of
the T was predictable from the distracter configuration on Repeated trials.
In the recognition task, participants were shown 2 blocks of 24 trials. The format of
each block was identical to the detection task: 12 Repeated configurations and 12 Non-
Repeated configurations shown in a random sequence. The Repeated configurations were
carried over from the detection task, while a new set of 24 Non-Repeated configurations
was generated for the recognition task using the same stimulus criteria used in the detection
task. Participants were asked to discriminate between Repeated configurations they had
seen previously and novel Non-repeated configurations as a means of assessing awareness.
2.1.1.4 Procedure
The experiment began with administration of the Logical Memory sub-scale of the
WMS-III. Next, participants were given instructions regarding the detection task. The
instructions provided onscreen examples of configuration stimuli and the 2 possible
orientations of the T, and asked participants to locate the letter T within the configuration of
Ls then respond by indicating the direction it is pointing using the left and right arrows on
the keyboard. Participants were advised to respond quickly and accurately, but they were
not informed that they should pay attention to any of the configurations for patterns or
repetitions. The main experiment began after 6 practice trials to establish task familiarity.
The presentation of each configuration was preceded by an orienting white dot (1 cm x 1
cm) for 1 sec in the centre of the screen. Each configuration was displayed until a response
was made, then auditory feedback was provided to the participant according to the accuracyChapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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of the response. A high-pitched tone (1800 hz) lasting 200 ms signified a correct answer,
and a longer 800 ms, low-pitched tone (200 hz) signified an incorrect answer. Each
individual trial was separated by a further 700 ms inter-trial-interval The blocks of
detection trials were separated by a break of at least 10 sec., after which participants could
either continue resting if necessary, or press the space bar to progress to the next block.
After the detection task, participants were asked to answer questions designed to
assess their awareness for the repeated configurations. Specifically, all participants were
asked, “During the experiment, do you think that any of the particular configurations of Ls
repeated?” Those who were aware of the repetition then received 2 further follow-up
questions. The first asked, “Approximately, when did you being to notice this repetition?”,
then participants were required to estimate the point in the task in which awareness
occurred using a slider labelled by block from 1 to 16. The final question asked “After you
realised particular configurations of Ls were being repeated, did you try to memorise these
displays?”
After completing the awareness questionnaire, all participants received instructions
for the recognition task. Participants were informed of the repetition of certain
configurations throughout the detection task, and told the recognition task would gauge
their knowledge of these repeated configurations. The instructions explained to participants
that they would see 24 repeated configurations randomly intermixed with 24 newly
generated configurations, and asked them to indicate their responses using the letter ‘O’ on
the keyboard on trials containing a configuration shown earlier in the detection task (Old
configurations), or the letter ‘N’ on trials displaying a configuration they did not recognise
from the detection task (New configurations).Chapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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Participants were told that RT was not measured in this portion of the experiment,
and advised to concentrate and respond as accurately as possible since they would also
receive 10 pence for every correctly identified configuration. No auditory feedback was
given in the recognition task, and a new trial was only initialised after a response to the
current trial had been made. After completing the recognition task, participants were given
on-screen feedback of their recognition performance, then administered the remaining
portion of the WMS-III. Although the duration of the detection and recognition tasks varied
across individuals, the interval between administrations of the WMS-III was kept constant
at 60 min for all participants.
2.1.2 Results
2.1.2.1 Detection Task
An ANOVA with Repetition as a within-subjects variable (Repeated versus Non-
Repeated) and Age (Older or Younger) as a between-subjects variable was used to analyse
mean accuracy in responding to the direction of the target letter in the detection task. There
was no main effect of Age, F(1, 38) = 1.18, p > .28, signifying that all participants in the
detection task demonstrated high accuracy overall (Older, M = 99%, SE = 0.21; Younger,
M = 99%, SE = 0.29). There was also no main effect of Repetition or Repetition x Age
interaction, F’s < 2.24, p’s > .14, which indicates that responses made while viewing Non-
Repeated configurations were just as accurate Repeated configurations overall in the
experiment and within each age group (Older, Repeated, M = 99%, SE = 0.30; Non-
Repeated, M = 99%, SE = 0.30; Younger, Repeated, M = 99%, SE = 0.30; Non-Repeated,
M = 99%, SE = 0.30).Chapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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The median RTs for correct responses were calculated for each set of Repeated and
Non-Repeated configurations in each block, then averaged across blocks to yield a
Repeated and Non-Repeated RT for each 4-block epoch (shown in Figure 2.2). A repeated-
measures ANOVA with Repetition (Repeated versus Non-Repeated) and Epoch (1-4) as
within-subjects variables and Age (Older or Younger) as a between-subjects variable
showed a main effect of Age on RT, F(1, 38) = 17.81, p < .001, reflecting the Older
group’s slower responding overall in the task compared to the Younger group (Older,
M = 2030 ms, SE = 177; Younger, M = 1249 ms, SE = 54). There is a motor learning
component to the task that caused participant to make more efficient responses with task
practice, as indicated by a significant main effect of Epoch (Epoch 1, M = 1777 ms,
SE = 116; Epoch 4, M = 1582 ms, SE = 113), F(3, 114) = 14.52, p < .001.
More interestingly, there was also a Repetition x Epoch x Age interaction,
F(3, 114) = 3.41, p = .02, indicating that greater response efficiency developed across the
task (Epoch 1 minus Epoch 4) for Repeated configurations in relation to Non-Repeated
configurations (i.e., contextual cuing) in Younger participants (Repeated, M = 276 ms,
SE = 45; Non-Repeated, M = 149 ms, SE = 37), compared to Older ones (Repeated,
M = 165 ms, SE = 77; Non-Repeated, M = 192 ms, SE = 93). No other interactions
approached significance, all F’s < 1.71, all p’s > .26.
A follow-up ANOVA of RTs in just the last epoch revealed a significant Repetition
x Age interaction confirming that contextual cuing differed between Older and Younger
participants (Older, Repeated, M = 2010 ms, SE = 195; Non-Repeated, M = 1982 ms,
SE = 167; Younger, Repeated, M = 1107 ms, SE = 56; Non-Repeated, M = 1229 ms,Chapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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SE = 56), F(1, 38) = 3.97, p = .05. There was no main effect of Repetition, F(1, 38) = 1.54,
p > .22.
An individual analysis of Younger participants’ data across the task confirmed that
contextual cuing occurred in this group, as revealed by both a main effect of Repetition,
F(1, 19) = 4.43, p < .05, and a Repetition x Epoch interaction, F(3, 57) = 9.76, p < .001.
Critically, the same analysis of the Older group’s data showed neither a main effect of
Repetition, F(1, 19) = 0.74, p > .40, nor a Repetition x Epoch interaction, F(3, 57) = 1.04,
p > .38. Individual t-tests on each epoch substantiated these differences in performance,
since a contextual cuing effect was apparent in Younger participants by Epochs 3 and 4 of
the task, t’s > 2.54, p’s < .02, whereas Older participants showed no sign of a difference in
RTs between configurations at any point, all t’s < 1.70, p’s > .10.Chapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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Figure 2.2. Means of the median reaction times (ms) for Older and Younger
participants over 4 epochs (epoch = 4 blocks) of the detection task in Experiment 1;
error bars represent standard errors.
One way of taking the overall difference in response speed between age groups into
account is to calculate a proportional measure of learning by dividing the difference
between Non-Repeated and Repeated RTs in the last epoch by the Non-Repeated RT
[(Non-Repeated-Repeated)/Non-Repeated]. Greater contextual cuing is signified by high
positive proportional contextual cuing scores. Figure 2.3 plots these proportional scores for
the 2 groups, and shows that when baseline response speed is factored out, Older
participants still showed lower levels of contextual cuing compared to Younger
participants, t(38) = 2.45, p < 0.02. In fact, the Older group’s contextual cuing was not
statistically different from zero, t(19) = 0.36, p > .72.Chapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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Figure 2.3. Mean proportional measure of contextual cuing in Experiment 1. This is
calculated by dividing the difference between Non-Repeated and Repeated RTs in the
last epoch of the task by the Non-Repeated RT [Non-Repeated-Repeated/Non-
Repeated]; error bars represent standard error.
2.1.2.2 Recognition Task
Conscious memory for Repeated configurations was assessed by comparing
participants’ ability to correctly discriminate these configurations from novel ones. Figure
2.4 plots hits (an ‘Old’ response to a Repeated display) versus false alarms (an ‘Old’
response to a Non-Repeated display), which were compared using a repeated-measures
ANOVA with Trial Type [Old (Repeated) vs. New (Non-Repeated)] and Block (1-2)
included as within-subjects variables and Age (Older or Younger) as a between-subjects
variable. This analysis showed a main effect of Trial Type, F(1, 38) = 6.17, p < .02, (Hits,
M = 0.55, SD = 0.13; False alarms, M = 0.48, SD = 0.12), meaning that participants were
able to discriminate between old and new displays. There was a marginal main effect ofChapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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Age, F(1, 38) = 3.32, p = .08, and a marginal Age x Trial Type x Block interaction, F(1,
38) = 3.82, p = .06, suggesting a difference in recognition ability between age groups,
although the Age x Trial Type interaction, F(1, 38) < 1, did not approach significance.
More importantly, in separate analyses of recognition performance, a main effect of
Trial Type, F(1, 19) = 8.39, p < .01, revealed evidence of awareness in the Younger group
while the Older group showed no such effect, F(1, 19) = 1.02, p >.32. The fact that
Younger participants showed neither a main effect of Block, F(1, 19) = 0.42, p >.52, nor a
Trial Type x Block interaction, F(1, 19) = 2.54, p > .12, suggests that significant awareness
was stable across the recognition task.
Both awareness and contextual cuing were present in the Younger group, while
neither of these effects were detected in the Older group. This suggests that conscious
memory ability may be linked to contextual cuing. In order to explore this possibility, we
correlated performance on the Logical Memory sub-scales of the WMS-III (Table 2.1) and
the proportional cuing score in each age group. The majority of these correlations were
weak and non-significant, Older, r’s < 0.11, p’s > .49; Younger, r’s < -0.10; p’s > .68.
There was a moderate negative relationship between performance on the Retention scale in
the WMS-III and the proportional cuing score shown in the Younger group, r = -0.30,
though this correlation also failed to achieve significance, p > .20.Chapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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2.1.2.3 Reported Awareness Results
Fourteen Older participants (70%) and 16 Younger participants (80%), χ
2 =0.53,
p > .46, reported noticing the repetition of configurations, with awareness occurring on
average at block 5 of the task for both groups, t(38) = 0.29, p > .77. Two (14%) Older and 3
(19%) Younger aware individuals used a memorization strategy after the repetition became
apparent. However, it is unlikely that realizing certain displays were repeating facilitated
detection performance in this experiment, since ANOVAs of performance in each age
group did not yield any significant interactions with reported awareness (Aware or
Unaware) when it was included as an additional between-subjects variable, all F’s < 1.91,
all p’s > .13. Further individual analyses of performance sub-divided by awareness were
also consistent with the overall results, in that both Aware and Unaware Younger
participants still showed Repetition x Epoch interactions, F’s > 4.69, p’s < .03, while
neither a main effect of Repetition nor a Repetition x Epoch interaction was obtained in
Aware or Unaware Older participants, all F’s < 1.42, p’s > .28.Chapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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Figure 2.4. Recognition performance for Older and Younger participants in
Experiment 1; error bars represent standard errors.Chapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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2.1.3 Discussion
This experiment was concerned with examining whether the longer task duration
employed in Experiment 1 of Howard et al. (2004) masked differences in the onset of
learning indicative of contextual cuing impairments in older adults. When a shorter task
was used here, the results showed that younger adults still developed gradual search
efficiency as well as the ability to later recognize Repeated configurations during an
awareness test, yet older adults showed no evidence of learning or awareness. Younger
adults displayed a reliable contextual cuing effect after only 12 exposures (3 epochs) to
these contextual cues, whereas older adults still failed to show contextual cuing after 16
exposures (4 epochs). While Howard et al. (2004) concluded that older and younger adults
performed at equivalent levels in the contextual cuing task, the findings from this
experiment indicate that the lack of age group differences reported in that study may have
been a by-product of insensitive statistical measures and near-asymptote learning. Instead,
it seems that older adults require more exposure to repeating contextual configurations than
younger adults before displaying evidence of learning.
Previous research has proposed that contextual cuing relies exclusively on implicit
processing; therefore, participants showing more efficient visual search during the detection
task should not show subsequent conscious access to this information in a test of awareness
(e.g., recognition or generation). Here, contextual cuing was clearly accompanied by
explicit recognition in the Younger group. We will return to the consideration of single and
dual-systems models of memory as pertaining to contextual cuing in Chapter 4; however,
the presence of awareness using a block-design version of the test employed in thisChapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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experiment questions the purity of the implicit processing entailed in the contextual cuing
task.
In addition to showing a lack of awareness and a later onset of learning, older
people also exhibited much slower responding in the detection task compared to younger
ones. Some studies have proposed that learning measures based on RT are artificially
inflated in older participants with slower baseline speed, because higher RTs allow for
more potential to develop response efficiency (Howard et al, 2004; Howard, Howard,
Dennis, & Yankovich, 2007, Fleischman, 2007; Manns & Squire, 2001). Experiment 2 of
Howard et al. (2004) specifically examined the possibility that older adults’ slower
responding obscured an age-related contextual cuing deficit by looking at performance in
younger participants using a more difficult detection task to inflate RTs; however, when
this slower younger group’s performance was compared to the older group in their
Experiment 1 there were no indications of performance differences.
It is relatively well-established that ageing is accompanied by slower response times
on a variety of speeded tasks (Light, 1991; Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009; Salthouse, 1980),
which has prompted many to conclude that performance on these tasks is adversely affected
by the deterioration of neural processing with age. Achard and Bullmore (2007) showed
that ageing resulted in less efficient transmission of signals between and within the
orbitofrontal, lateral temporal, and medial temporal regions in older individuals, when they
compared functional connectivity between the cortical and subcortical regions in the brains
of younger and older adults during a resting state.
In Processing Speed theory (Salthouse, 1985; 1996), the slower baseline speed of
responding systematically shown by older participants on cognitive tasks is assumed to beChapter 2: Contextual Cuing in Older Adults
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indicative of general slowing. Cognitive slowing diminishes processing efficiency,
hindering the ability to preserve information waiting to be processed in the periphery while
performing fundamental cognitive operations. Consequently, these mechanisms produce
degraded or incomplete representations of relevant information that are crucial to task
performance, which results in lower levels of memory performance in slow older
populations. A large body of evidence can be marshalled showing that age-related cognitive
decline is often eliminated when general processing speed is included as a covariate.
Contextual cuing impairments in amnesics and children have also been accompanied by
slower overall RTs in comparison to controls (Howard et al., 2004; Vaidya, Huger,
Howard, & Howard, 2007).
This raises the question of whether slower processing speed prevented older adults
in Experiment 1 from encoding as much information about the contextual associations in
Repeated configurations. In the next chapter, a cognitive slowing explanation of older
adults’ contextual cuing deficits is explored in a group of younger participants by altering
properties of the displays to simulate the slower responses of older adults.55
3 Processing Speed and Contextual
Cuing
The study described in Chapter 2 demonstrates that older adults have difficulty
exploiting the spatial cues contained in the contextual cuing task to the same degree as
younger adults, therefore questioning Howard et al.’s (2004) claim of age constancy in
contextual cuing. Although it is possible that the older group’s impairments in Experiment
1 indicate that a task-specific processing decline occurs with age, the fact that such
impairments were also accompanied by slower overall response latencies leads us to
consider cognitive slowing as another plausible explanation of the older group’s
performance.
In the series of experiments presented in this chapter, cognitive slowing is addressed
as a possible mechanism for the older adults’ contextual cuing deficits in Experiment 1. In
Experiments 2 and 3, with younger participants, the display properties were altered to
increase search difficulty and to simulate the slower response latencies of older people.
Experiment 4 examined the converse hypothesis, whether older adults’ contextual cuing
ability improved when they received a less difficult search task to make their response
latencies faster.
3.1 Experiment 2
The approach that is adopted in this experiment investigates the influence of
cognitive slowing on contextual cuing performance in a group of healthy younger adults
when their response speeds are similar to those of older adults. Using younger participants
eliminates the confounding influence of memory deficits known to develop with age, but itChapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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can be difficult to find a method to sufficiently simulate the cognitive slowing that causes
longer response latencies in older adults. Supporters of the notion that age-related slowing
is the underlying cause of cognitive decline do not normally sanction simply using slowed
stimulus pacing or allowing unlimited time to respond as a method of eliminating
performance differences between older and younger adults (Park, 1992). Merely slowing
down younger adults is not enough. The manipulation should produce slower responding
by impeding the encoding of contextual information contained in repeated configurations.
In other words, it needs to simulate the mechanisms that cause a processing lag in cognitive
ageing.
Chun and Phelps (1999) successfully slowed down younger participants to match
the response times of amnesic participants by increasing the difficulty of visual search in
the detection task, specifically using altered distracter letter Ls that looked more similar to
the target letter T. Howard et al. (2007), using an SRT task, found that lowering the contrast
ratio between the stimuli and the display background also increased younger participants’
response times and led to degraded sequence learning. The present experiment imposes
both of these manipulations on groups of younger participants to determine whether
cognitive slowing can sufficiently account for the contextual cuing impairments
demonstrated by older adults in Experiment 1. Reduced levels of contextual cuing in these
artificially slower younger participants would implicate slower response speed as the cause
of older adults’ contextual cuing impairments.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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3.1.1 Method
3.1.1.1 Participants
One-hundred and twenty undergraduate students took part in this experiment (89
women and 31 men), and received credit for part of an introductory Psychology course at
University College London. All of the participants were between 18 and 30 years old (M =
19.77, SD = 2.61). The visual appearance of the displays shown in the experiment differed
between participants. Forty participants performed the task seeing a low contrast difference
between the letter stimuli and background screen, another group of 40 participants saw
distracter letters with an offset manipulation, and finally there were 40 participants in a
control condition who received a standard version of the task, similar to that used in
Experiment 1, that did not contain any display manipulations (all shown in Figure 3.1).
3.1.1.2 Design
Participants only performed the detection task, which was a 3 x 2 x 4 mixed-
factorial design (Display Condition x Repetition x Epoch) with Display Condition (Offset,
Contrast, or Control) as a between-subjects variable, and Repetition (Repeated and Non-
Repeated) and Epoch (1-4) manipulated within-subjects. The detection task measured RT
for detecting the target letter and accuracy in identifying the orientation of the target in the
configuration for each trial. The recognition awareness test was not included in this
experiment, because the focus was on how learning varied with overall response speed.
Participants still received the series of awareness questions from Experiment 1 after the
detection task.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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3.1.1.3 Materials and Apparatus
The instructions and procedure described in Experiment 1 were slightly modified
for creating and presenting all of the configurations of letters used for this experiment. The
colour manipulation included in the original experiments by Chun and colleagues was
removed so that all stimuli were presented in white against a grey background. The
detection task in the Control group was identical to that used in Experiment 1, but the
display properties viewed by participants in the Offset and Contrast groups were altered in
order to slow down response times. In the Offset group, the vertical segment of each
distracter letter L was offset by 0.34 cm from the horizontal line of the letter, which made it
more difficult to detect the target amongst the distracters. In the Contrast group, the screen
colour contrast between the grey background and the letters in the display was reduced
from maximum contrast to a 38% contrast level, making it difficult to distinguish the entire
display of letters (target and distracters) from the screen background.
3.1.1.4 Procedure
Participants received instructions asking them to search for the letter T in the
display of letter Ls as quickly and accurately as possible. Each set of instructions included a
visual example of the type of display seen throughout the task, which was customized for
each participant group. Participants were also informed that they were prohibited from
adjusting any of the display settings manually. All other aspects of the detection task were
identical to Experiment 1.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 3.1. The displays shown in each Display Condition of the detection task: (a)
Control, (b) Contrast, and (c) Offset. The grey background colour of these displays
during the experiment has been changed to black to emphasise the contrast
manipulation.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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3.1.2 Results
3.1.2.1 Detection Task
The display manipulations produced different response accuracies between viewing
conditions. An ANOVA with Repetition as a within-subjects variable (Repeated versus
Non-Repeated) and Display Condition (Control, Contrast, or Offset) as a between-subjects
variable, revealed a main effect of Viewing Condition, F(2, 117) = 13.71, p < .001.
Participants in the Control and Contrast groups demonstrated high accuracy overall
(Control, M = 98%, SE = 0.17; Contrast, M = 99%, SE = 0.15), t(78) = 1.71, p >.09, while
participants in the Offset group found it more difficult to distinguish targets from distracters
leading to significantly lower response accuracy than the Control and Contrast groups (M =
97%, SE = 0.38), t’s > 3.43, p’s < .001. Nevertheless, there were no differences in response
accuracy for Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations overall, F(2, 117) = 2.83, p > .10,
or in any of the Display Conditions, F(2, 117) = 0.78, p > .46.
A repeated-measures ANOVA was used to compare detection latencies between the
groups (shown in Figure 3.2), and included Repetition (Repeated and Non-Repeated) and
Epoch (1-4) as within-subjects variables and Display Condition (Control, Contrast, or
Offset) as a between-subjects variable. There was a main effect of Display Condition,
F(2, 117) = 268.19, p < .001, confirming that the display manipulations produced
considerable differences in response speed between groups with more than a doubling of
response times in the Offset group (Control, M = 1053 ms, SE = 44; Contrast,
M = 1268 ms, SE = 29; Offset, M = 2986 ms, SE = 99). Recall that the purpose of these
manipulations was to artificially match younger participants’ response speed to older
participants, so we compared the speeds of Offset and Contrast participants to the OlderChapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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adults in Experiment 1. It was expected that Offset participants would be slower in relation
to Control participants, t(78) = 17.88, p < .001; however, somewhat surprisingly they were
also slower than the Older group in Experiment 1 (M = 2030 ms, SE = 177), t(58) = 5.11,
p < .001. The Contrast participants, although slower than the Control group, t(78) = 4.07,
p < .001, responded faster than Older participants in Experiment 1, t(58) = 5.81, p < .001.
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Figure 3.2. Means of the median reaction times (ms) for younger Control, Contrast,
and Offset groups in Experiment 2; error bars represent standard error of the mean.
All participants responded faster with practice, as shown by an overall main effect
of Epoch, F(3, 321) = 48.73, p < .001, but there was also an Epoch x Display Condition
interaction, F(6, 351) = 5.95, p <.001, suggesting that the amount of speed up from Epoch 1
to Epoch 4 differed between Display Conditions (Control, M = 142 ms, SE = 23; Contrast,Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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M = 175 ms, SE = 20; Offset, M = 436 ms, SE = 69). This difference is probably a
consequence of the Offset group’s slower responding allowing more opportunity to develop
motor efficiency.
Although the Repetition x Display Condition interaction did not approach
significance, F(2, 117) < 1, and the main effect of Repetition, F(1, 117) = 3.68, p = .06, and
the Repetition x Epoch interaction, F(6, 321) = 2.52, p = .06, were only marginally
significant, the presence of a reliable three-way Repetition x Epoch x Display Condition
interaction, F(6, 351) = 2.13, p < .05, suggested that contextual cuing developed at different
rates across groups.
An ANOVA of Repeated and Non-Repeated configuration RTs during the last
epoch showed an overall main effect of Repetition, F(1, 117) = 14.27, p < .001, indicative
of a difference in RTs by the end of the task, and revealed only a marginal Repetition x
Display Condition interaction, F(2, 117) = 2.61, p > .08, which is most likely due to greater
learning produced by the offset manipulation. Further pairwise comparisons of RT data in
the last epoch also showed that a significant detection advantage resulted for Repeated
configurations in all 3 Display Conditions (Control, M = 57 ms, SE = 18; Contrast,
M = 42 ms, SE = 25; Offset, M = 159 ms, SE = 61), all t’s > 1.71, all p’s < .05 (1-tailed).
Indeed, in absolute terms, the group most similar to the older group from Experiment 1 in
terms of baseline RT – the Offset group – showed the largest learning effect.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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Figure 3.3. Mean proportional measure of contextual cuing across younger
participant groups in Experiment 2; error bars represent standard error.
As discussed in Experiment 1, there is a danger that learning can be overestimated
when measured by RT differences, since there is more scope for developing efficiency
when RTs start out high. Therefore, a proportional contextual cuing score was again
calculated to quantify learning while taking into account baseline response speed within
each group as in Experiment 1 (Figure 3.3). Consistent with the difference scores, there was
no difference in cuing levels between groups, F(2, 117) < 1, indicating that contextual
cuing did not diminish in younger participants when their processing speed was artificially
slowed down to match the speed of older adults in Experiment 1. However, only the
Control and Offset groups’ contextual cuing scores were statistically greater than zero,
t’s > 1.73, p < .05 (one-tailed).Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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3.1.2.2 Reported Awareness Results
Sixty-four percent (77/120) of participants reported detecting the repetition
manipulation and a further 10% of these individuals engaged in a memorisation strategy
after they noticed that repetitions occurred. There were marginal statistical differences
across groups in the number of participants who reported awareness (Control = 70%;
Contrast = 73%; Offset = 50%), χ
2 = 5.29, p > .07, and no differences in the number of
aware participants who tried to memorise Repeated configurations (Control = 11%;
Contrast = 10%; Offset = 10%), χ
2 = 0.27, p >.87. A repeated-measures ANOVA of the
detection data including reported awareness as a between-subjects variable showed neither
a main effect of nor any significant interactions with Awareness, all F’s < 1.66, p’s > .20.
This leads us to conclude that performance was not affected by an underlying realization
that displays may have repeated during the detection task.
3.1.3 Discussion
This experiment aimed to address concerns raised by the slower response times that
accompanied the contextual cuing impairments demonstrated by older adults in Experiment
1, which suggest that poor performance may be a corollary of slower processing speed
associated with cognitive ageing. In this experiment, we were able to simulate the
perceptual-motor slowing of the older adults in Experiment 1 in younger adults by altering
the properties of the displays. These display manipulations slowed down response times to
different degrees, with the offset adjustment inducing the greatest degree of slowing.
Despite the severity of their processing speed impairment, Offset participants still
showed equal levels of contextual cuing to the Contrast and Control participants in thisChapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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experiment. In fact, the only consequence of slowing was an increase in the Offset
participants’ capacity to develop motor efficiency with practice, which has typically been
shown in past studies that have employed similar offset manipulations (Chun & Phelps,
1999; Manns & Squire, 2001). Ideally the offset manipulation would have produced similar
response impediments across younger participants, indicating that a similar level of
cognitive slowing had been applied. The overall response time of the Offset group across
the task indicates that the altered letter stimuli provoked slower responding on a group
level; however, applying a uniform amount of offset to the distracter stimuli slowed down
participants to varying degrees (as evident by high variability in the Offset group’s overall
response latency).
3.2 Experiment 3
Experiment 2 compared contextual cuing in younger participants when the
properties of the display were modified to produce slower responses. Altering the contrast
of the display did not slow down detection performance enough to afford comparison to the
speed of responding of older adults in Experiment 1. Yet while the offset manipulation
significantly impeded participants’ detection speed on the whole, contextual cuing was not
impaired. Experiment 3 attempts to replicate this result using a more tailored offset
manipulation intended to control for the surprising amount of individual differences shown
in the Offset group in the previous experiment. In this experiment, the computer program
titrates the amount of offset applied to the distracter letters according to younger
participant’s response speed at predefined intervals to calibrate response speed to the
latencies shown by older participants.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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Recall that in Experiment 1 we found that younger adults showed a substantial
contextual cuing effect by the end of a 16 block detection task, whereas older adults did not
show evidence of learning at all, and Howard et al. (2004) found that a contextual cuing
effect in older and younger adults developed after a 30 block detection task. This led us to
believe that the reason we did not find contextual cuing in older adults may have been
because Experiment 1 used a shorter detection task. Consequently, the duration of the
detection task in Experiment 3 was lengthened to match the procedure of Howard et al.
(2004) and an older control group was included in this study.
3.2.1 Method
3.2.1.1 Participants
Thirty older adults ranging in age from 59 to 83 years old (M = 67.65, SD = 7.47) and
30 younger adults between 18 and 30 years old (M = 23.07, SD = 3.47) volunteered to take
part in the study. Older participants were recruited via an advertisement in a local
newspaper, while all younger participants came from the UCL Psychology subject pool. All
participants were in good health and free from diagnoses of neurological disorders, and
were paid £15 for their time plus an additional 10 pence for every configuration identified
correctly in the generation task. These groups were matched for gender, education, and on
the vocabulary subscale from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III) (3
rd ed.,
Weschler, 1997a), but as expected (shown in Table 3.1), differed in performance on several
tests of memory and processing speed taken from the Weschler Memory Scale (WMS-III)
(3
rd ed., Weschler, 1997b) and the WAIS-III, all t’s > 2.03, all p’s < .05.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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Table 3.1. Participant Demographics in Experiment 3
Slow Younger Older
(n = 30) (n = 30)
Gender
Female 19 20
Male 11 10
Age M = 23.07 (3.47) M = 67.65* (7.47)
Education (years) M = 14.87 (1.50) M = 14.63 (2.27)
Memory
WMS-III Logical Memory I Recall M = 46.03 (7.68) M = 34.70* (9.83)
WMS-III Logical Memory II Recall M = 29.30 (6.01) M = 21.33* (6.62)
WMS-III Logical Memory Recognition M = 27.03 (2.28) M = 25.40* (2.49)
WMS-III Logical Memory Retention M = 87.58 (9.55) M = 85.11 (17.45)
Adult Intelligence Scale
Vocabulary M = 48.17 (6.34) M = 47.87 (13.46)
Digit Span M = 19.83 (3.99) M = 17.97* (3.06)
Digit Symbol Coding Task M = 96.80 (19.06) M =61.60* (14.93)
Numbers in brackets denote standard deviations.
* p < .05
3.2.1.2 Design
The design of the detection task was a 2 x 2 x 7 mixed-factorial (Age Group x
Repetition x Epoch), with Age Group (Older or Slow Younger) as a between-subjects
variable, and Repetition (Repeated and Non-Repeated) and Epoch (1-7) manipulated
within-subjects. The generation task was a 2 x 2 x 4 (Age Group x Repetition x Block)
mixed-factorial design, with Age Group (Older or Slow Younger) as a between-subjects
variable, and Repetition (Repeated and Non-Repeated) and Block (1-4) manipulated
within-subjects. Each participant’s accuracy in responding to the location of the missing
target letter in each trial was measured for each configuration condition in each block
during the generation task.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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3.2.1.3 Materials and Apparatus
The instructions and procedure described in Experiment 1 were slightly modified
for creating and presenting all of the configurations of letters used for this experiment. The
colour manipulation included in the original experiments by Chun and colleagues was also
removed so that all stimuli were presented in white against a grey background, and the
length of the detection task from Experiment 1 was extended from 16 to 30 blocks of trials
(from 4 to 7 epochs). These task modifications were performed in order to replicate the
procedure used in Howard et al. (2004).
The display properties were also altered to slow down the response time of Younger
participants. Specifically, the vertical segment of each distracter letter L was offset from the
horizontal line of the letter. The amount of offset applied to the distracter letters varied
between individual participants from 1.16 mm to 2.17 mm and depended on the
participants’ speed of responding during Block 1 of the task. The program calibrated the
offset for each participant by taking the mean RT at 3 different intervals in the first block
(after trials 8, 16, and 24), then increasing the amount of offset applied to the letter Ls if the
speed of responding was faster than the criterion RT of 3,550 ms (the baseline response
speed of older adults in the control condition). At the end of the first block of trials, the
amount of offset applied remained constant for the remainder of the task. The amount of
offset applied was increased by 0.34 mm for half of the participants to make the target
letters more difficult to discern from distracter letters, because the smaller offset of 0.24
mm did not consistently slow down responses in Slow Younger participants. The Older
group did not receive this initial calibration manipulation in Block 1, but they wereChapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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presented with slightly offset distracter stimuli (1 mm) on all trials to minimise any general
perceptual processing differences caused by the offset manipulation.
Awareness was measured using a generation task, replacing the recognition task,
because past research has shown that generation is more sensitive in gauging awareness
than recognition (Chun & Jiang, 2003). For this reason, each display in the detection task
now appeared with 2 grey dotted lines bisecting the screen horizontally and vertically,
which divided the screen into 4 equal quadrants to aid later in the generation task.
The generation task was made up of 4 blocks of 24 trials each. The format of a
single block was identical to a block in the detection task: 12 Repeated configurations and
12 Non-Repeated configurations shown in a random sequence in each block. The Repeated
configurations were carried over from the detection task, while a new set of 48 Non-
Repeated configurations was created specifically for the generation task. However, all of
the configurations shown in the generation task differed from the detection task stimuli in
that all T’s in the detection configurations were replaced with L’s.
3.2.1.4 Procedure
The experiment began with the administration of the Logical Memory I scale of the
WMS-III. The remainder of the memory tests shown in Table 3.1 were given upon
completion of the detection and generation tasks (approximately 60 minutes later). The
detection task progressed exactly as in Experiment 1, starting with instructions to
participants to locate the T in the configuration using the arrow keys followed by on-screen
examples of a configuration and the new offset letter stimuli. After the 6 practice trials, the
Older participants proceeded with the detection task exactly as in Experiment 1, while Slow
Younger participants received a calibration block of 24 trials so that the right amount ofChapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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offset could be applied in the remaining 29 blocks of trials to adequately slow down their
responses. At the end of the detection task, participants answered the same series of
awareness questions administered in the previous two experiments.
Immediately afterward, participants performed the generation task. The instructions
informed all participants that they had in fact been presented with a repeated series of
configurations during the detection task, and explained that the generation task would test
their knowledge of these repeated configurations. The task requirements were presented as
a slight variation of the detection task, in that participants were told that they would see a
set of configurations similar to those seen previously, but this time the T would be replaced
with an L. The instructions for the generation task prompted participants to respond with
the quadrant location of this substitute L using the numeric keypad on the right-hand side of
the keyboard. The response layout on the keypad mimicked the spatial layout of the
quadrants in the display, with the “7” and “9” keys corresponding to the top left and right
quadrants and the “1” and “3” keys corresponding to the bottom left and right quadrants. It
was emphasized that responding as accurately as possible was a priority in this phase of the
experiment, and that it was more important to concentrate on the correct answer, not the
time taken to respond. A new configuration was presented only after a valid response was
given, and without an orienting dot or breaks between blocks of trials. At the end of the
task, participants were informed of their accuracy, then the experimenter administered the
remaining subscales of the WAIS. The duration of the experiment was roughly 2 hours.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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3.2.2 Results
3.2.2.1 Detection Task
Slow Younger group showed lower accuracy in identifying the orientation of the
target stimulus than the Older group (Slow Younger, M = 91%, SE = 1.38; Older, M =
99%, SE = 0.11), which was confirmed by the presence of a main effect of Age Group in
the ANOVA of response accuracy during the detection task, F(1,58) = 32.07, p < .001. This
was expected since the offset manipulation made it difficult to identify the target letter
among similar-looking distracter stimuli. Response accuracy was similar for Repeated and
Non-Repeated configurations during the detection task overall and within each group (Slow
Younger, Repeated, M = 92%, SE = 1.41; Non-Repeated, M = 91%, SE = 1.41; Older,
Repeated, M = 99%, SE = 0.15; Non-Repeated, M = 99%, SE = 0.11), as made evident by
the fact that neither the main effect of Repetition, nor the Repetition x Age Group
interaction approached significance, F’s < 1.28, p’s > .26.
RTs from the first block of trials were excluded from all analyses, because this
served as a calibration block for the Slow Younger group. The median RTs for each
configuration type in each block (shown in Figure 3.4) were calculated using only correct
responses from Blocks 3-30. Data from Block 2 were also excluded from the analyses so
that a uniform number of blocks (4) could be collapsed into each epoch. The average RT
for Non-Repeated configurations in the first epoch was used to measure the speed of
responding, and showed that the offset manipulation was successful in matching response
latency between participant groups (Slow Younger, M = 3872 + 207 ms; Older, M = 3523 +
155 ms), t(58) = 1.37, p > .18.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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Although half of participants in the Slow Younger group received more
perceptually similar stimuli (with 0.34 cm offset increments applied to the distracter letters
rather than 0.24 cm increments), there were no statistical differences in response speed,
t(28) = 1.44, p > .16, or detection performance, all F’s < 1.78, all p’s > .19, when these sub-
groups were compared.
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Figure 3.4. Means of the median reaction times (ms) for Older participants and Slow
Younger participants, in a detection task of 7 epochs (Blocks 1 and 2 omitted; each
epoch = 4 blocks); error bars represent standard error of the mean.
A repeated-measures ANOVA was used to analyse detection performance, and
included Repetition (Repeated and Non-Repeated) and Epoch (1-7) as within-subjects
variables and Age (Older or Slow Younger) as a between-subjects variable. Participants
responded faster in general with task practice, as shown by a main effect of Epoch,Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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F(6, 348) = 15.74, p < .001. More importantly, there was also a main effect of Repetition,
F(1, 58) = 4.25, p < .05, suggesting that overall participants responded more efficiently to
Repeated configurations. However, the non-significant Repetition x Epoch interaction,
F(6, 348) < 1, suggests that this difference may have occurred quite early on in the
detection task.
The ANOVA also showed an overall main effect of Age, F(1, 58) = 4.75, p < .04,
which indicates that RTs in the Slow Younger group exceeded those in the Older group.
Although there were no significant interactions with Age, all F’s < 1, as discussed in
Chapter 2, null effects should be interpreted with caution as there may have been
insufficient statistical power to detect more subtle performance differences. Consequently,
the Slow Younger and Older data sets were analysed using separate ANOVAs.
Findings from an ANOVA of RTs in the Older group were consistent with the
overall ANOVA, in that there was a significant main effect of Epoch, F(6, 174) = 29.72,
p < .001, and no Repetition x Epoch interaction, F(6, 174) < 1. The main effect of
Repetition approached significance, F(1, 29) = 3.78, p = .06, so follow-up pairwise
comparisons between Repeated and Non-Repeated RTs in each epoch were performed to
see if a detection advantage for Repeated configurations was present at any point in the
task. These comparisons indicated that Older participants did not develop a response speed
advantage for Repeated configurations over Non-repeated configurations, all t’s < 1.67, all
p’s > .10.
An individual ANOVA of performance in the Slow Younger group also continued
to show a main effect of Epoch, F(6, 174) = 3.79, p < .001; however, neither the main of
effect of Repetition, F(1, 29) = 1.02, p > .32, nor the Repetition x Epoch interaction,Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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F(6, 174) = 1.16, p > .33, approached significance. These findings imply that the stimulus
manipulations imposed in this version of the detection task prevented contextual cuing from
occurring in the Slow Younger group.
A proportional measure of contextual cuing was also computed in this task, using
the method employed in the previous experiments (Figure 3.5). Older and Slow Younger
individuals showed statistically equivalent levels of learning, t(58) = 1.02, p > .31, but the
Slow Younger group’s proportional cuing score was statistically different from zero,
t(29) = 2.08, p < .05, while the Older group’s was not, t(29) = 0.56, p > .58. This subtle
difference may imply that the Slow Younger group showed some evidence of contextual
cuing in the task, but the group’s higher response times may have obscured an underlying
cuing effect from achieving significance in the ANOVA. Alternatively, as discussed in the
Discussion section of Chapter 2, it is also possible that their artificially inflated response
times also gave Slow Younger participants a greater propensity to develop a response
advantage for Repeated configurations.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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Figure 3.5. Mean proportional measure of contextual cuing across participant groups
in Experiment 3; error bars represent standard error.
Additionally, the longer detection task included in this experiment in an attempt to
replicate findings of contextual cuing in older adults by Howard et al. (2004), did not
facilitate contextual cuing, since there was no difference between the levels of cuing shown
by older participants in Experiment 1, who received only 16 blocks of trials, and the Older
group in this study after 30 blocks of trials, t(48) = 0.63, p > .5. Although the Slow
Younger participants received twice as many trials during the detection task, their cuing
score was almost half of younger participants in Experiment 1; however, this difference
was not reliable, t(48) = 1.07, p > .28.
In an attempt to relate a measure of processing speed to contextual cuing ability, we
correlated performance on the Digit Symbol Coding Task and the proportional cuing score.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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This correlation was weak and non-significant both in the group as a whole, r = - .03, p >
.8, and when examined using just data from the Older participants, r = .03, p > .8. This
relationship was more substantial and marginally significant in the Slow Younger group, r
= - .36, p = .05, though seemingly in the opposite direction to that predicted by Processing
Speed theory since faster response speed is related to higher scoring on the Digit Symbol
Coding Task. Though upon further inspection, this relationship may be explained by the
fact that amount of tailored offset manipulation applied to the distracter stimuli was
dictated by participants’ response speed, so faster participants experienced a heavy
response speed calibration manipulation (i.e., they viewed more heavily offset distracter
letter stimuli) which most likely resulted in less contextual cuing transpiring (Elizabeth
Maylor, personal communication, November 17, 2009).
We also correlated the standardised memory measures (Table 3.1) collected from all
participants and the proportional cuing score. However, none of these correlations achieved
significance in the Slow Younger group (r’s > -0.27, p’s > .16). In the Older group, there
was a negative correlation between the Digit Span measure of working memory and
proportional cuing, r = -0.41, p < .03, somewhat surprisingly indicating that higher working
memory capacity coincided with lower contextual cuing. All of the other correlations with
the WMS-III measures of memory were weak and non-significant, r’s > -0.27, p’s > .25.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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3.2.2.2 Reported Awareness Results
The longer task length also resulted in a higher rate of reported awareness in this
experiment overall, with 23 Older participants (77%) and 29 Slow Younger participants
(97%) answering that they picked up on the repetition of configurations. Seven (30%)
Older and 4 (14%) Younger of these aware individuals reported using a memorisation
strategy after the repetition became apparent. The mean onset of awareness occurred at
block 12 of the task for Slow Younger participants and block 9 of the task for Older
participants, t(50) = 1.59, p > .11. However, reported awareness did not seem to help these
participants to perform better in the task, since there was no interaction between Awareness
and Repetition nor a three-way Repetition x Epoch x Awareness interaction when
performance was re-analysed in each age group and segmented by awareness, all
F’s < 2.07, all p’s > .16.
3.2.2.3 Generation Task
Results from the generation task are presented in Figure 3.6, and were analysed
using a repeated-measures ANOVA with Repetition (Repeated vs. Non-Repeated) and
Block (1-4) as within-subjects variables and Age (Slow Younger or Older) as a between-
subjects variable. Participants did not show a main effect of Repetition overall, F(1, 58) <
1, meaning that there was no difference in generation accuracy between Repeated and New
configurations. There was also no Repetition x Age interaction, F(1, 58) < 1, or main effect
of Age, F(1, 58) = 3.40, p > .07, to suggest divergent performance between Older and Slow
Younger participants, and this was verified further by individual ANOVAs of the SlowChapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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Younger and Older data with neither group showing a main effect of Repetition nor a
Repetition x Block interaction, all F’s < 1.
There was a change in generation accuracy as the task progressed, as shown by a
main effect of Block, F(3, 174) = 5.48, p < .001, but a significant Block x Age Group
interaction, F(3, 174) = 5.16, p < .002, implies that the pattern of change was different
between Slow Younger and Older adults. Post-hoc tests compared generation accuracy for
Repeated configurations in each block to performance at chance level (25%), which is
indicative of no awareness. In Older adults, performance never exceeded chance
performance, all t’s < 1.02, p’s > .31, and there were never differences in accuracy between
Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations, all t’s < 0.78, p’s > .51. Generation accuracy
for Repeated configurations did exceed chance level in Block 4 of the task for Younger
participants, t(29) = 2.47, p < .02; all other t’s < 1.70, p’s > .10; however, a pairwise
comparison between Repeated and Non-Repeated accuracy in Block 4 showed no
difference in performance, t(29) = 0.17, p > .86; all blocks t’s < 1.10, p’s > .28. These
findings imply that conscious awareness of contextual cuing knowledge was not present in
either participant group.79
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Figure 3.6. Generation performance for Older and Younger participants for
Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations as compared to chance performance
(25%); error bars represent standard error of the mean.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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3.2.3 Discussion
This experiment aimed to address the concerns raised by Experiment 1 that the
contextual cuing impairments in older adults may have been caused by cognitive slowing.
We were able to closely match younger participants’ response speed to the slower response
times demonstrated by the older participants in this experiment by altering the letters so as
to increase the similarity between the target and distracter letters according to each younger
participant’s initial baseline response speed.
The results of this experiment do not provide convincing evidence that slow
response speeds produce equivalent levels of contextual cuing in Older and Slow Younger
participants. The results of the ANOVA suggested that contextual cuing was absent in the
Slow Younger group. However, further comparisons of Slow Younger participants’
proportional cuing scores to zero showed evidence of significant cuing. Neither the
ANOVA nor the analysis of proportional cuing gave a clear indication that contextual cuing
occurred in Older participants. Although collectively these findings suggest that the display
manipulations in this experiment impeded Slow Younger participants’ performance to some
degree in relation to Younger participants in Experiment 1 (though not statistically), we
maintain that these results also imply that the letter stimulus modifications in this
experiment and Experiment 2 did not adequately simulate the specific processing
impediments experienced by older participants.
Experiment 3 employed a 30 block detection task identical in design to that of
Howard et al. (2004) to see if a longer task produced contextual cuing in older participants.
Although the marginal main effect of Repetition obtained in the individual analysis of
Older participants’ data could be taken as an indication that some participants may haveChapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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developed more efficient responding for Repeated configurations, all follow-up tests
showed no indication that implicit contextual cuing occurred at a group level in the older
participants. This result was not only a failure to replicate the findings of Howard et al.
(2004), but also undermines our original assumption that older adults would eventually
show learning when given more detection trials. These findings, in conjunction with the
fact that proportional cuing scores also remained low or negative for all of the older adults
in Experiments 1 and 3, suggest that older populations show little, if any, contextual cuing
effect at all, or at least with the amounts of exposure used here.
A closer examination of a follow-up awareness analysis in Howard et al. (2004)
supplied some insight into how an overall contextual cuing effect was obtained for older
participants in their study. Fifteen older participants (42% of the total group) verbally
reported awareness of the display repetition critical to the contextual cuing paradigm, and
subsequently a separate analysis of learning was performed on this sub-group which
revealed that these participants failed to show evidence of contextual cuing. This analysis
was included to imply that reported awareness may have interfered with these older
participants’ contextual cuing performance, but it also exposed the fact that a contextual
cuing effect was not present in a large portion of the older group included in Howard et
al.’s (2004) study. Therefore, the presence of a contextual cuing effect may have been
caused by a small group of older participants who showed exceptional levels of implicit
contextual cuing.
Additionally, a statistical relationship between processing speed and contextual
cuing was only evident in the younger group, and even then it suggested actually that faster
processing speed hindered cuing. Although it would be tempting to conclude that olderChapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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adults’ contextual cuing decrements are not a product of general perceptual slowing,
perhaps slower response speed exacerbates other cognitive deficits that are inherent to
ageing.
3.3 Experiment 4
Although slow younger participants in Experiments 2 and 3 did not show evidence
of contextual cuing decrements, this does not necessarily mean that the slower processing
speed found in Older participants in Experiment 1 played no role in the deficits they
showed. Instead, it is possible that slower response speed interacts with other cognitive
deficits that occur with age. In Experiment 4 we examined older adults’ contextual cuing
performance under conditions that promoted faster response speeds.
If slower responding has an age-specific involvement in impairing contextual cuing,
we would expect older participants’ learning deficits to be abolished or at least attenuated
when response speed mimics that of younger adults. In contrast, similar levels of contextual
cuing in fast older and naturally slower old adults would suggest that processing speed is
not the critical factor and would implicate the involvement of another age-specific
cognitive impairment.
3.3.1 Method
3.3.1.1 Participants
Twenty-five older participants (M = 66.72, SD = 6.82) were recruited specifically to
take part in this experiment, using an advertisement at an adult education centre, and paid
£15 for their time. All of these participants were in good health, free from diagnoses of
neurological disorders, and assigned to the Easy Detection group (n = 20), while the data
from the Older group of participants in Experiment 3 were included in all analyses as aChapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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control group and will be referred to as the Difficult Detection Older group (n = 30). The
Easy Detection Older group viewed more distinctive distracter stimuli (Ss instead of Ls) in
an attempt to speed up their responses. The 2 groups of older participants were matched for
age, education, and on most of the subscales of the WMS-III tests of memory and
intelligence shown in Table 3.2, all t’s < 1.39, p’s > .17. The Easy Detection Older group
scored higher on the second Logical Memory Recall subscale, t(48) = 2.66, p < .01, and
marginally better on the Vocabulary subscale, t(48) = 1.90, p = .06.
Table 3.2. Participant Demographics in Experiment 4
Difficult Detection
Older
Easy Detection
Older
(n = 30) (n = 20)
Gender
Female 20 15
Male 10 5
Age M = 67.65 (7.47) M = 65.20 (5.57)
Education (years) M = 14.63 (2.27) M = 14.20 (1.77)
Memory
WMS-III Logical Memory I Recall M = 34.70 (9.83) M = 38.20 (9.67)
WMS-III Logical Memory II Recall M = 21.33 (6.62) M = 26.50* (6.86)
WMS-III Logical Memory Recognition M = 25.40 (2.49) M = 25.35 (3.28)
WMS-III Logical Memory Retention M = 85.11 (17.45) M = 86.50 (11.45)
Adult Intelligence Scale
Vocabulary M = 47.87 (13.46) M = 54.35 (8.62)
Digit Span M = 17.97 (3.06) M = 19.45 (4.52)
Digit Symbol Coding Task M =61.60 (14.93) M =63.85 (14.27)
Numbers in brackets denote standard deviations.
* p < .01Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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3.3.1.2 Design
This version of the detection task was a 2 x 2 x 6 (Task Difficulty x Repetition x
Epoch) mixed-factorial design, with Detection Task Difficulty (Easy or Difficult)
manipulated between-subjects, and Repetition (Repeated and Non-Repeated) and Epoch (1-
6) manipulated within-subjects. Following the detection task, participants undertook a 2 x 2
x 4 (Detection Task Difficulty x Repetition x Block) mixed-factorial design generation
task, with Detection Task Difficulty (Easy or Difficult) as a between-subjects variable, and
Repetition (Repeated and Non-Repeated) and Block (1-4) a within-subjects variables. The
generation task measured participants’ awareness of the Repeated configurations shown
during the detection task by assessing accuracy in providing the region of the display which
the now “missing” target letter appeared in during the detection task.
3.3.1.3 Materials and Apparatus
The instructions and procedure described in Experiment 2 for creating and
presenting all of the configurations of letters were also used for this experiment. The
detection task was extended from 16 to 30 blocks of trials (from 4 to 6 epochs). All
participants were still required to search for a letter T, but for the Easy Detection Older
group this target letter now appeared amongst 11 letter S’s as distracters instead of L’s.
A generation test was used to measure awareness was identical the one used in
Experiment 3; however, all of the configurations now appeared with the T’s replaced by S’s
in the Easy Detection Older group.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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3.3.1.4 Procedure
The experiment began with the administration of the Logical Memory I scale of the
WMS-III. The remainder of the memory tests shown in Table 3.2 were given upon
completion of the detection and generation tasks (approximately 60 minutes later). The
detection task progressed exactly as in Experiment 1, starting with instructions to
participants to locate the T in the configuration using the arrow keys followed by on-screen
examples of a configuration and the new offset letter stimuli. After 6 practice trials
participants continued with the detection task as in Experiment 1, which was followed by
the awareness questionnaire.
Immediately after the self-report awareness measure, participants received the
generation task. At the end of the task, participants were informed of their accuracy, and
they were administered the remaining subscales of the WAIS. The duration of the
experiment was roughly 2 hours.
3.3.2 Results
3.3.2.1 Detection Task
An ANOVA with Repetition as a within-subjects variable (Repeated versus Non-
Repeated) and Group (Difficult Detection Older or Easy Detection Older) as a between-
subjects variable was conducted on accuracy data in the detection task. ). There was no
main effect of Group, F(1, 48) = 1.29, p > .26, indicating that both groups of older
participants demonstrated high response accuracy overall (Difficult Detection Older, M =
99%, SE = 0.10; Easy Detection Older, M = 100%, SE = 0.11). Furthermore, response
accuracy was also similar for Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations overall and
within each participant group during the detection task (Difficult Detection Older,Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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Repeated, M = 99%, SE = 0.15; Non-Repeated, M = 99%, SE = 0.11; Easy Detection Older,
Repeated, M = 100%, SE = 0.14; Non-Repeated, M = 99%, SE = 0.16), with neither the
main effect of Repetion, F(1, 48) = 0.12, p > .73, nor a Repetition x Group interaction,
F(1, 48) = 0.13, p > .86, approaching significance in the ANOVA.
Repeated-measures ANOVA was used to compare detection latencies between the
groups (shown in Figure 3.7), and included Repetition (Repeated and Non-Repeated) and
Epoch (1-4) as within-subjects variables and Detection Task Difficulty (Easy or Difficult)
as a between-subjects variable. There was a main effect of Task Difficulty on RTs, meaning
that altering the distracter letters within the visual search displays produced faster responses
in the Easy Detection Older group (Difficult Detection Older, M = 3178 ms, SE = 131;
Easy Detection Older, M = 842 ms, SE = 44), F(1, 48) = 180.85, p < .001.
All participants showed an improvement in baseline response speed across the task,
as evidenced by the main effect of Epoch (Epoch 1, M = 2598 ms, SE = 207; Epoch 6,
M = 1990 ms, SE = 158), F(5, 240) = 40.86, p < .001. However, there was also an Epoch x
Task Difficulty interaction, F(5, 240) = 17.88, p < .001, indicating a ceiling effect in the
amount of motor efficiency that could be achieved in the Easy Detection Older group
(M = 182 ms, SE = 45) compared to the Difficult Detection Older group (M = 882 ms,
SE = 108). Most importantly, the ANOVA showed no indication that contextual cuing
occurred at a group level, as neither the main effect of Repetition, F(1, 48) = 2.61, p > .11,
nor the Repetition x Epoch interaction, F(5, 240) < 1, were significant. Though the
Repetition x Task Difficulty interaction was marginally significant, F(1, 48) = 3.53,
p = .07, there was no further evidence of performance differences between groups as the
Repetition x Epoch x Task Difficulty, F(5, 240) < 1, interaction was not significant. TheChapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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latter result was consistent with a follow-up ANOVA comparing RT performance between
configurations and between groups in the last epoch of the task, which showed neither a
main effect of Repetition nor a Repetition x Task Difficulty interaction, F’s < 1.15,
p’s > .28. Individual comparisons of Repeated and Non-Repeated RTs in each epoch for
each participant group also confirmed that contextual cuing was not evident at any point in
the task, since the only difference that approached significance was a response advantage
for Non-Repeated configurations, t(19) = 1.88, p > .07, in the third epoch in the Easy
Detection Older group, all other t’s < 1.60, p’s > .12.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
1 2 3 4 5 6 Epoch
R
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
T
i
m
e
(
m
s
)
Difficult Detection Older Repeated
Difficult Detection Older Non-Repeated
EasyDetection Older Repeated
EasyDetection Older Non-Repeated
Figure 3.7. Means of the median reaction times (ms) for Difficult Detection Older
participants and Easy Detection Older participants, in Experiment 4; error bars
represent standard error of the mean.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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Perhaps changing the distracter letters to S’s to make RTs in the Easy Detection
Older group faster also changed the nature of visual search during the detection task,
because the target letter was so easily visible within each display. It is also possible that
since Easy Detection Older participants were already responding very quickly at the
beginning of the task, there was little potential to develop further efficiency for Repeated
displays. Therefore, a group of younger participants (n = 18) were given this version of the
detection task to examine whether contextual cuing was still possible under these visual
conditions. These younger participants responded even faster than the Easy Detection Older
participants (M = 543 ms, SE = 17), t(36) = 6.15, p < .001. An ANOVA of the younger
group’s data also showed a significant main effect of Epoch, F(5, 85) = 6.54, p < .001, and
more importantly, a main effect of Repetition, F(1, 17) = 13.91, p < .002, confirming that
contextual cuing can still occur under these faster response conditions. The
Repetition x Epoch interaction was not significant, F < 1, but a non-significant contextual
cuing effect in the first epoch, t(17) = 1.87, p = .08, became highly significant by the last
epoch, t(17) = 3.11, p < .007.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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Figure 3.8 Mean proportional measure of contextual cuing across older participants in
the Easy Detection and Difficult Detection groups in Experiment 4; error bars
represent standard error.
The proportional analysis of cuing performed in the previous experiments was also
carried out on this dataset, but consistent with the overall ANOVA, neither the Difficult
Detection Older nor the Easy Detection Older group’s cuing score was statistically greater
than zero, t’s < 1.47, p’s > .15. If anything, Figure 3.8 shows that the Easy Detection Older
participants learned less, although not reliably, than the Difficult Detection Older
participants on the contextual cuing task, t(48) = 0.94, p > .30.
We also examined whether processing speed was related to the amount of contextual
cuing the Easy Detection Older participants showed by correlating their proportionalChapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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measure of cuing to their Digit Symbol Coding Task score (Table 3.2). This relationship
was weak and non-significant, r = .22, p > .34, providing further evidence that older adults’
slowed processing is not responsible for their impaired performance on this task.
In Experiment 3, we obtained a negative correlation between the Digit Span measure
of working memory and the proportional measure of cuing in the Difficult Detection Older
group, r = -.41, p < .03. No such relationship was shown in the Easy Detection Older group,
r = -.01, p > .95, though we did find that these participants’ proportional cuing scores were
positively related to their performance on the Recognition sub-scale of the WMS-III, r =
.53, p < .02. No other reliable statistical relationships were observed between cuing and the
other standardized measures of memory in these individuals, p’s > .19.
3.3.2.2 Reported Awareness Results
Fourteen Easy Detection Older participants (70%) and 23 Difficult Detection Older
participants (77%), χ
2 = 0.28, p > .59, reported noticing the repetition of configurations,
with awareness occurring at blocks 9 and 8 respectively, t(35) = 0.56, p < .57. Nine of the
23 (39%) Difficult Detection Older aware individuals said they used a memorization
strategy after the repetition became apparent, while only one of the Easy Detection Older
aware individuals reported use of this strategy. ANOVAs were performed in each group of
older participants with Awareness (Aware or Unaware) included as an additional between-
subjects variable, but showed no significant interactions with this variable, all F’s < 1. This
leads us to conclude that noticing the repetition manipulation did not produce a contextual
cuing advantage.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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Figure 3.9. Generation performance for Difficult and Easy Detection Older
participants for Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations as compared to chance
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3.3.2.3 Generation Task
In a repeated-measures ANOVA of generation performance (shown in Figure 3.9)
we included Task Difficulty (Easy or Difficult) as a between-subjects variable and
Repetition (Repeated and Non-Repeated) and Block (1-4) as within-subjects variables.
There was no main effect of Repetition, F(1, 58) < 1. There was also no main effect of
Block or interaction between Repetition and Block, all F’s < 1. The ANOVA showed no
interactions with Task Difficulty, suggesting no differences in performance between the
Easy and Difficult Detection Older groups, all F’s < 1.55, p’s > .22. Performance which
exceeds the level of success dictated by chance (25% accuracy) could also indicate that
participants were consciously aware of configuration information; however, neither group
showed evidence of successful generation ability when task performance was compared
with chance, all t’s < 1.32, p’s > .20.
In sum, the data show that detection task difficulty did not affect performance, since
neither group of older participants showed evidence of contextual cuing or generation
ability.
3.3.3 Discussion
In this version of the task, we altered the distracter letters to simulate the faster
baseline response speed of younger adults in an ageing population. Although the Easy
Detection Older participants responded much faster than the Difficult Detection Older
controls, they still did not show a contextual cuing effect. Indeed, the proportional cuing
scores of Easy Detection Older participants in this experiment were reliably lower than
those of the Younger participants in Experiment 1 and (younger) Control participants inChapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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Experiment 2, t’s > 2.52, p’s < .01, despite the fact the Easy Detection Older participants
received almost twice as many detection trials.
Modifying the detection task to make it easier was successful in eliciting faster
responses in Easy Detection Older participants, but it raises the concern that the new
combination of stimuli produced a pop-out effect for the target stimulus. If this occurred it
could be considered an alternative explanation for the absence of a contextual cuing effect
in Easy Detection Older participants, since performance on the task would no longer
require directed visual search. There was also the possibility that the overall speed of
responding was so fast to begin with that it left little opportunity for developing significant
response improvement to Repeated displays. However, it is unlikely that the nature of the
task changed qualitatively or that there was a ceiling effect in overall response times in the
Easy Detection Older group, since a contextual cuing effect was elicited in a group of
younger participants who showed faster RTs when given the easier version detection task
From these results it is clear that slow responding was not the source of the
learning impairments shown by slower older adults in Experiment 1 and the Difficult
Detection Older participants in this experiment, but rather that older adults experience other
age-specific cognitive limitations which interfere with their ability to learn about the
contextual cues available in the detection task.
All older participants showed poor ability to generate target information in the
awareness test. This finding is not surprising considering that no evidence of learning
emerged in the detection task itself. In addition, the presence of recognition ability in
younger adults in Experiment 1 and of a positive statistical association between
performance on the Recognition sub-scale of the WMS-III and the proportional measure ofChapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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cuing and of a positive statistical association between performance on the Recognition sub-
scale of the WMS-III and the proportional measure of cuing suggests there may be an
association between the implicit contextual cuing effect and explicit recognition ability.
Therefore, this experiment demonstrates that neither inducing the faster baseline
response speed of younger adults in an ageing population, nor extending the detection task,
yielded learning in these older adults.
3.4 Discussion of Experiments 2-4
In this chapter, we pursued a processing speed explanation of older adults’
impairments by altering the properties of the stimuli in the displays shown to both younger
and older participants in order to slow down or speed up response latencies.
Slower response latency in older participants seemed to coincide with the
impairments they demonstrated in the contextual cuing task. In Experiments 2 and 3, we
investigated the idea that cognitive slowing may account for older adults’ impairments by
seeing how contextual cuing changed in younger participants when the display properties
required more effortful responding. In Experiment 2, we investigated the idea that cognitive
slowing may account for older adults’ impairments by seeing how contextual cuing
changed in younger participants when the display properties required more effortful search.
While the offset and contrast display manipulations induced markedly higher response
times than the Control group, only the Offset group’s speed of responding approximated
the levels of Older participants in Experiment 1. Although younger participants’ responses
in the Offset group could be successfully “aged” in speed, comparable levels of contextual
cuing were shown between groups regardless of response speed.Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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Slow Younger participants in Experiment 3, who experienced customized amounts
of the offset to alter their response speed more precisely, showed some evidence of
contextual cuing decrements in relation to the younger participants from Experiment 1.
However, comparisons of the proportional contextual cuing measure showed that the Slow
Younger participants still outperformed Older participants on the detection task in
Experiment 3. From this we concluded that processing speed may not provide a general
explanation of impairment in learning overall, but could still play a role in contextual cuing
in older adults.
In Experiment 4, we asked whether “youthful” (i.e., faster) older participants would
be able to overcome some of the contextual cuing deficits they exhibit normally. Despite
their faster response times, the Easy Detection Older participants still demonstrated
contextual cuing impairments that were identical to those seen in the naturally slower
Difficult Detection Older group (whose performance replicated that of the Older group in
Experiment 1).
Salthouse (1991; 1996) has proposed an extreme argument for cognitive slowing,
the Processing Speed Theory, which argues that standardized measures of perceptual speed
can explain most of the age-related variance in performance on many cognitive tasks.
Subsequent studies by Salthouse and colleagues have found substantial evidence in favour
of this parsimonious explanation of age-related differences for many aspects of cognitive
functioning (Salthouse & Babcock, 1991; Fristoe et al., 1997; Salthouse, Atkinson, &
Berish, 2003; Tucker-Drob & Salthouse, 2008); however, this theory has not been applied
extensively to older adults’ performance on implicit memory tasks (but see Salthouse et al.,
1999). If processing speed can account for the contextual cuing deficits shown by olderChapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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adults in Experiment 4, we would have expected to find a relationship between measures of
contextual cuing and a standard index of processing speed like the Digital Symbol Coding
Task. Such relationships were not observed.
Chun and Phelps (1999) found that artificially slower younger participants still
outperformed slower amnesics with general hippocampal and temporal lobe damage in the
task, which prompted them to conclude that these brain structures are vital to performance
and that processing speed was not a factor in contextual cuing. That pattern is therefore
similar to the one observed here for the effects of ageing. In contrast Manns and Squire
(2001) found that slower hippocampal amnesic participants showed intact learning, and
amnesic participants with more extensive damage to the medial temporal and lateral
temporal lobes were impaired on the task but were not slower in relation to controls. Most
importantly, they also found that inducing slower responding in younger participants
produced behaviour akin to the unimpaired hippocampal amnesics, which led them to
conclude that slowing aided contextual cuing. Our findings are not inconsistent with either
of these studies, in that both found a substantial cuing effect in artificially slower
participants. However, our results point to a similar conclusion to that of Chun and Phelps
(1999), namely that lower levels of contextual cuing in older individuals may be linked to
impaired medial temporal lobe functioning rather than their slower speed of responding.
There were also some superficial differences between Experiment 1 and the design
and participant make-up of participants in Howard et al.’s Experiment 1 that could
potentially account for the disagreement in results. The British participants in Experiments
1 and 3 had fewer years of formal education in relation to the American participants in
Howard et al. (2004) [Experiment 1, M = 13.55, SD = 2.39; Experiment 3, M = 14.63, SD =Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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2.27; Experiment 4, Easy Detection Older, M = 14.20, SD = 1.77; Howard et al. (2004)
Experiment 1, M = 17.22, SD = 5.61], which is probably due to the shorter length of the UK
education system in relation to the American education system. Individual differences in
level of education and other forms of crystallized intelligence have been shown to relate
directly to the severity and rate of cognitive decline with age (Birren & Morrison, 1961;
Heaton, Grant, & Matthews, 1986; Kaufman, Reynolds, & McLean, 1989), so this seems a
relevant source of our participants’ poor contextual cuing. That being said, the older adults
included in Experiments 3 and 4 in this thesis also scored higher than the older adults in
Experiment 1 of Howard et al. (2004) on the standardised vocabulary measure [Experiment
3, M = 47.87, SD = 13.46; Experiment 4, Easy Detection Older, M = 54.35, SD = 8.62;
Howard et al. (2004) Experiment 1, M = 35.58, SD = 7.59], yet still showed no sign of
being able to learn in the contextual cuing task.
The slight differences in the appearance of stimuli between the experiments in this
thesis and those in Experiment 1 of Howard et al. (2004) also merit discussion. First of all,
the stimuli presented to participants in Howard et al.’s study were uncoloured. The stimuli
in Experiment 1 were based on those shown in Chun and Jiang’s first contextual cuing
experiments (Chun & Jiang, 1998; 2003) where the stimuli appeared in colour. Howard et
al. also included a slight offset manipulation for distracter letters, which they argued would
enhancing contextual cuing (e.g., Chun & Phelps, 1999). Considering the results of
Experiment 1, this assumes that the colour manipulation we included hindered contextual
cuing in our older participants. It is possible that the extra colour information creates more
cognitive load during encoding and causes lower quality representations to be formed;
however this is not likely to be the case, since the contextual cuing task in Experiment 3Chapter 3: Processing Speed and Contextual Cuing
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was a direct replication of that of Howard et al. (2004), and these participants did not view
coloured stimuli and received a slight letter offset but still demonstrated little or no ability
to show contextual cuing.
Our failure to replicate the significant learning effect found in Howard et al. (2004)
also challenges the popular notion that explicit memory is impaired while implicit forms of
memory remain intact in cognitive ageing (Fleischman, 2007). Moreover, the presence of
recognition ability in younger participants in Experiment 1 questions the purely implicit
nature of the contextual cuing task. It bears mentioning that older adults’ logical memory
scores in Experiment 1 were also much lower than those of older participants’ from
Howard et al. (2004) [Experiment 1, M = 28.60, SD = 15.10; Howard et al. (2004)
Experiment 1, M = 38.97, SD = 25.11]. It is possible therefore that contextual cuing in older
adults is impaired simply because this sort of processing requires explicit memory
resources. While we are not able to determine the specific cause of the deficits older
participants show in the contextual cuing task from these findings alone, it is still implied
that the mechanism behind these deficits in learning is intrinsic to cognitive ageing.99
4 Awareness in Contextual Cuing
The previous chapter approached age-related differences in contextual cuing by
examining other resulting differences in performance as a possible explanation of older
adults’ impairments. Not only did younger participants respond much more quickly than
older adults in the contextual cuing task, as demonstrated extensively in Chapter 3; but they
also exhibited the ability to consciously retrieve acquired information on explicit tests
(Chapter 2). In the present chapter, the perspective shifts from analyzing the factors of
cognitive slowing hypothesized to lead to older adults’ poor contextual cuing to looking
more closely at the possible sources of successful contextual cuing ability in younger
adults.
Younger participants show facilitation for displays they have been exposed to
repeatedly during a visual search task, which indicates that they have acquired some sort of
mental representation of these displays that they rely upon to aid their search. However, in
the majority of previous research, they do not show evidence of being able to consciously
use these representations to support performance during a recognition (Barnes et al. 2008;
Chun & Jiang, 1998; 1999; Chun & Phelps, 1999; Howard et al., 2004; 2006; Huang, 2006;
Manns & Squire, 2001; Nabeta, et al., 2003; Pollman & Manginelli, 2009; Schankin &
Schubo, 2009; van Asselen et al., 2009) or generation test (Bennett et al., 2008; 2009; Chun
& Jiang, 2003; Park et al., 2004). This dissociation between unconscious learning and
conscious retrieval has led researchers to conclude that the contextual cuing phenomenon
reveals the existence of a purely implicit processing mechanism.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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Despite finding a lack of awareness on an explicit recognition test, Greene et al.
(2007) obtained imageing data showing that participants recruited the hippocampus when
performing a contextual cuing task. Such a result implies that neural structures thought to
support only conscious or declarative processing (Squire, 1992) may be operating on
implicit contextual cuing knowledge even when awareness is absent. However, the null
effect in the recognition test in Greene et al. may simply be an artefact of low power and
sensitivity. Contextual cuing in Experiment 1 was accompanied by an awareness effect in
younger adults when a modified recognition test was used, while older adults showed
neither significant contextual cuing nor awareness. This leads us to question whether
existing measures of awareness in contextual cuing experiments are accurate gauges of
conscious processing.
In the following experiments, we focus on the awareness effect that accompanied
contextual cuing in younger adults in Experiment 1. In order to address the possibility that
the informational source of contextual cuing may actually be accessible to explicit memory
retrieval processes, we examined the power and reliability of existing measures of
awareness used in contextual cuing experiments, the motivational influence of including an
incentive for accurate performance in the explicit test, as well the magnitude of awareness
when measured after varying lengths of the detection task and degrees of contextual cuing.
The presence of awareness in these experiments would conflict with the idea that
implicit knowledge is functionally distinct and inaccessible to conscious processing as
proposed in dual-systems theories of memory. Therefore, perhaps it would be more
appropriate to characterize the memory decrements that occur in healthy ageing as aChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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general memory loss, rather than as impairments specific to consciousness at the time of
processing.
4.1 Experiment 5
Younger participants in Experiment 1 demonstrated evidence of possessing
awareness for contextual cuing information by performing above chance on a recognition
task. The recognition task in that experiment included twice the number of explicit trials
traditionally used in previous versions of the task where participants did not show
significant recognition ability ((Barnes et al. 2008; Chun & Jiang, 1998; 1999; Chun &
Phelps, 1999; Howard et al., 2004; 2006; Huang, 2006; Manns & Squire, 2001; Nabeta, et
al., 2003; Pollman & Manginelli, 2009; Schankin & Schubo, 2009; van Asselen et al.,
2009). Yet there have been several demonstrations of reliable recognition using the original
shorter task design of the recognition test (Brockmole & Henderson, 2006; Endo & Takeda,
2005; Olson & Jiang, 2004; Olson et al. 2005; Ono et al., 2005; Peterson et al., 2002;
Preston & Gabrieli, 2008; Vaidya et al., 2007), which tend to be ignored in discussions of
the implicit nature of the task in the contextual cuing literature. Although these findings, in
conjunction with the presence of awareness in Experiment 1, are potentially challenging to
the claim that contextual cuing is implicit, previously discussed criticisms of recognition
tests as a measure of awareness are still relevant.
In the present experiment, we used the same 24 block detection task included in
Chun and Jiang (2003), but extended the generation task they employed from 24 trials to 96
to examine whether the contextual knowledge learned during experiments in contextual
cuing is only accessible to implicit processes. If younger participants in past experiments
did actually have explicit access to contextual knowledge from the detection task, we wouldChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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expect to see an ability to generate target locations emerge with the introduction of more
trials in the generation task. Such a result would lead us to conclude that previous null
explicit results in generation tasks (Bennett et al., 2008; 2009; Chun & Jiang, 2003; Park et
al., 2004) can be attributed to inadequate probing for explicit knowledge in those
experiments. Alternatively, if participants still show chance-level generation performance
after an extended test, such a result would strengthen Chun and colleagues’ claim that
contextual cuing measures truly implicit processes.
4.1.1 Method
4.1.1.1 Participants
Forty-one younger participants (22 women and 19 men) ranging from 18-35 years
old (M = 22.98, SD = 3.23) were recruited from the UCL Psychology subject pool and paid
£5 for participating, plus an additional 10 pence for each correct response given in the
generation task. None of these participants had taken part in any other contextual cuing
experiments.
4.1.1.2 Design
The detection task was a 2 x 24 (Repetition x Block) within-subjects design.
Participants’ RT for detecting the target and accuracy in identifying the orientation of the
target in the configuration were measured in each trial. The variation in the length of the
detection task across participants that is intrinsic to the titrated design used subsequently in
Experiment 7 does not make analysis of performance by epoch feasible; therefore, blocks
of trials were not collapsed into epochs in the remaining experiments to keep the analyses
uniform across this chapter. The generation task was a 2 x 4 (Repetition x Block) within-Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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subjects design. Participants’ ability to correctly generate the location of the target was
measured for each configuration condition in each block.
4.1.1.3 Materials and Apparatus
The detection task used in this experiment was a replication of the 24-block
detection task employed by Chun and Jiang (2003), but was implemented by modifying the
Visual Basic program used in Experiment 1 to include more blocks of trials. This detection
task also differed from the version included in Experiment 1 in that it was followed by an
extended generation test (Chun & Jiang, 2003) as in Experiments 3 and 4. Subsequently,
the displays shown during the detection task also included 2 dark grey dotted lines to divide
the screen into a 4-quadrant matrix in order to match the stimuli used to test awareness in
the generation task.
4.1.1.4 Procedure
Except for the omission of the WMS-II test, the procedure was identical to those
reported in past experiments. Participants were given the same set of detection task
instructions followed by 6 practice trials before beginning the detection task. When the task
finished, they answered the series of questions regarding awareness and then completed the
generation task. This task lasted approximately 50 min.
4.1.2 Results
4.1.2.1 Detection Task
One participant was excluded from all analyses because of poor accuracy in
identifying the orientation of the target letter during the detection task (75%). The
remaining participants demonstrated high accuracy overall (M = 99%, SE = 0.14), with noChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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difference in accuracy between Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations, t(39) = 0.39,
p = .70.
The means of the median RTs for Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations
across the experiment are plotted in Figure 4.1. The contextual cuing effect illustrated in
Figure 4.1 was reinforced statistically using a repeated measures ANOVA with Repetition
(Repeated and Non-Repeated) and Block (1-24) as within-subjects variables. A main effect
of Block, F(23, 897) = 13.36, p < .001, indicated that RTs declined across the blocks.
Although the Repetition x Block interaction was not significant, F(23, 897) = 1.33, p > .10,
a significant main effect of Repetition, F(1, 39) = 12.24, p = .001, confirmed that
participants detected targets more rapidly in repeated than Non-Repeated configurations.
There was no difference between RTs for Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations in
Block 1, t(39) = 0.74, p > .40. From these results, it can be concluded that substantial and
reliable contextual cuing occurred during the detection task.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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Figure 4.1. Means of the median reaction time (ms) over 24 blocks of the detection
task for Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations in Experiment 5; error bars show
standard error of the mean.
4.1.2.2 Reported Awareness Results
A total of 29 participants (73%) reported awareness for the repetition of
configurations, with the mean onset of awareness occurring at Block 10 of the search task.
Six (21%) of these aware individuals reported that they adopted a memorization strategy
after the repetition became apparent.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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Figure 4.2. Mean accuracy over the 4 blocks of the generation task for Repeated and
Non-Repeated configurations in Experiment 5; error bars show standard error of the
mean.
4.1.2.3 Generation Task
Generation accuracy for each participant was calculated for each configuration
type— in each block and overall—then, comparisons were made between configuration
conditions in order to evaluate participants’ ability to successfully identify the location of
the “substitute” L. Chance performance is indicated by no difference in generation accuracy
between configuration conditions, because successful generation for Non-Repeated
configurations is due entirely to chance. Figure 4.2 plots the mean accuracy scores in each
Repetition condition for each block of the task. The overall mean for Repeated
configurations was 30.6% and that for Non-Repeated configurations 26.1%. A repeated-
measures ANOVA on generation accuracy using Repetition (Repeated or Non-Repeated)Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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and Block (1-4) yielded a significant main effect of Repetition, F(1, 39) = 8.94, p < .006,
confirming higher accuracy for Repeated configurations over Non-Repeated ones across the
task. Neither the main effect of Block, F(3, 117) = 1.19, p > .30, nor the Repetition x Block
interaction, F(3, 117) = 0.65, p >.50, approached significance. One-sample t-tests
comparing generation accuracy for Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations in all of the
blocks of the task to chance performance (25%) showed that generation for Repeated
configurations in each block and overall was significantly above chance, all t(39)’s > 2.0,
all p’s < .05, whereas there was no difference between generation for Non-Repeated
configurations and chance performance, all t(39)’s < 1.58, all p’s > .10.
Higher accuracy for Repeated configurations seems to suggest that participants were
aware of the repeating contexts in the detection task. However, the small magnitude of this
effect raises the concern that successful generation may have occurred for only 1 or 2 of the
configurations learned during detection, whereas contextual cuing itself might occur for
many more (perhaps all) of the configurations. To address this possibility, we sought to
compare the number of Repeated configurations showing contextual cuing during detection
to the number of consistently generated Repeated configurations. Since the configurations
were different for each participant, this analysis can only be done at the level of individual
participants and not aggregated over configurations. An individual analysis for each of the
12 Repeated configurations was conducted for each participant using data from both tasks.
The mean RT over the last 4 blocks of the detection task was computed for each Repeated
configuration and compared with the participant’s mean RT for Non-Repeated
configurations over these blocks. A Repeated configuration was classified as learned if this
RT fell below the 99% confidence interval of the mean Non-Repeated RT, indicating thatChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
108
contextual cuing occurred (we adopted a 99% interval because the large number [12] of
contrasts risks an inflation of the Type I error rate). This analysis yielded a surprising
result—namely that the mean number of configurations for which contextual cuing
occurred was very low (M = 1.55, SD = 1.8). Thus, on average, a typical participant only
learned 1 or 2 configurations (Mdn = 1). For the generation data, overall accuracy was
computed for each Repeated configuration. With only 4 presentations of each pattern, it is
somewhat arbitrary to determine when a pattern was “learned” in the explicit test.
However, if we take 3 out of 4 correct quadrant responses (75%) as indicating awareness,
then the number of learned patterns (M = 1.55, SD = 1.47) is very similar to that obtained in
the analysis of the contextual cuing effect. If 4 out of 4 (100%) is the criterion, then the
mean number is 0.55 (SD = 0 .99).
Figure 4.3 contains plots of each Repeated configuration’s RT data against
generation performance from high- and low-performing individuals in both tasks. Panel A
shows data from the participant with the most configurations showing contextual cuing,
panel B from the participant with the fewest configurations showing contextual cuing (this
is the participant from among 16 with no reliably learned configurations who showed the
smallest search advantage for repeated displays in the last 4 blocks of the task). Panel C is
for the participant with the highest overall generation performance, and panel D for the one
with the lowest overall generation performance. The figure emphasizes that contextual
cuing is not evenly distributed across configurations and small or negative for many. With
the mean number of implicitly-learned patterns being so low, it is hard to argue that more
information was acquired during the detection task than was accessed in the generation
task. But these results tell us nothing about the correlation between contextual cuing andChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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Figure 4.3. Graphs plotting individual RT data against generation performance for
each Repeated configuration (arbitrarily numbered 1-12) from the participant with
(a) the most configurations showing contextual cuing, (b) the fewest configurations
showing contextual cuing (this is the participant from among 16 with no reliably
learned configurations who showed the smallest search advantage for Repeated
displays in the last 4 blocks of the task), (c) the highest overall generation
performance, and (d) the lowest overall generation performance.
Repeated Configuration RT
Mean Non-Repeated Configuration RT
Confidence Interval of Mean (99%)
Overall Generation AccuracyChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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awareness. We calculated a correlation for each participant between the mean RT of each
Repeated configuration over the last 4 blocks of the detection task and percent correct for
the same configuration during the generation task. These individual correlations were
mostly weak and nonsignificant, and the overall mean correlation (z score transformed) for
all of the participants was also low (M = 0.09). However, with a small number of patterns—
many of which had generation scores of 50%— the absence of a significant correlation
between these measures is perhaps not particularly diagnostic.
In order to explore the implicit-explicit correlation further, participants were divided
into 2 groups according to their generation performance. Participants with no overall
difference in accuracy between Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations during
generation (i.e., across the 48 repeated patterns in the generation test, they made the same
number of or fewer correct target quadrant predictions as across the 48 Non-Repeated
patterns) were assigned to an Unaware subgroup (n = 17), and their data from the last 4
blocks of the detection task were recalculated. Neither the main effect of Repetition,
F(1, 16) = 3.31, p > .09, nor the Repetition x Block interaction, F(3, 48) = 1.99, p > .12,
were significant. In contrast, an ANOVA using data from the remaining subgroup of aware
participants revealed a main effect of Repetition, F(1, 22) = 10.51, p < .004, though no
Repetition x Block interaction, F(1, 22) = 1.48, p > .22, indicating that successful
generation and detection performance were evident in the Aware subgroup, whereas neither
contextual cuing nor awareness were present in the Unaware subgroup.
Although this result implies that there is a necessary link between learning and
awareness, it does not automatically follow that the information explicitly recalled during
the generation task accounts entirely for the contextual cuing shown during the detectionChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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task. For example, it is possible that a contextual cuing effect remains after removal of
configurations for which participants showed explicit awareness (demonstrated by above-
chance generation performance). In order to examine this possibility, RT data for a given
configuration were removed from an individual’s detection data if the participant showed
accuracy greater than chance (25%) for that configuration during the generation task. On
average, this criterion resulted in the removal of 4 out of 12 configurations from each
participant’s dataset. A reanalysis of the detection data showed that there was still a main
effect of Repetition, F(1,39) = 7.53, p < .01, which suggests that the contextual cuing effect
was partly sustained by contextual information for configurations that participants were not
subsequently aware of during the generation task. We assess the interpretation of such
analyses based on post hoc data selection in the Discussion section at the end of the
chapter.
Despite the evidence of good generation performance, the results do not contradict
the original findings from Chun and Jiang (2003). Performance in Block 1, which is
equivalent to the entire 24-trial explicit test used by those authors, also showed no
difference in generation accuracy between Repeated (29.6%) and Non-Repeated
configurations (28.3%), t(39) = 0.40, p > .60; however, the fact that higher generation
accuracy for Repeated configurations was evident with subsequent blocks of trials suggests
that previous experiments did not include enough trials to detect the effect. Increasing the
number of trials improved the power of the explicit test to show that participants’
awareness of the contextual information from the detection task does produce successful
memory for repeated configurations during the generation task.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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The data do not allow us to determine whether the null result on Block 1 is simply
an issue of low power or whether there is a genuine increase in the Repeated-Non-Repeated
effect across blocks (e.g., akin to hypermnesia). The Block x Repetition interaction was not
significant, and in any case, the change across blocks seems to be due more to a reduction
in performance in the Non-Repeated condition than to an increase in the repeated one.
However, this trend was not supported statistically, since the main effect of Block was not
significant for generation performance in the Non-Repeated condition, F(3,117) = 0.88,
p > .40.
4.1.2.4 Reliability Analysis
Reliability of the generation task was assessed in a manner similar to the method
used in Buchner and Wippich (2000) in which the Repeated trials in each block were
divided into 2 subgroups of 6 trials each (using an odd-even method of assignment) for
each individual. Then, the mean generation accuracy was computed for each subgroup of
trials and, finally, the means of the sub-groups were correlated to evaluate reliability. A
high correlation within a set of trials indicates that the task is reliable or, more specifically,
that the measure is consistently precise in estimating the participant’s awareness of
contextual cuing information. Reliability represents the amount of true variance in
proportion to observed variance. A measure with low reliability results in data with a higher
proportion of error variance, requiring the existing effect to be quite large to reach
statistical significance and therefore lowering the statistical power of the measure (Meier &
Perrig, 2000).
Reliability in the first block of generation trials was weak and non-significant,
r = 0.09, p > .50, indicating that shorter versions of the generation task used in previousChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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experiments were not reliable. However, when reliability was computed using all 48
Repeated generation trials, a strong correlation was found between the means of the
subgroups, r = 0.46, p = .003, confirming that the inclusion of more trials produces a more
reliable test which is statistically more powerful than the single-block design used in Chun
and Jiang (2003). Reliability was low in the final generation block, as shown by a weak,
non-significant correlation between measures of accuracy, r = 0.19, p > .20. This result not
only confirmed that measuring generation using a single block of trials is not reliable across
the experiment, but also discounted the possibility that a change in participant behaviour
across blocks was responsible for the awareness effect.
4.1.2.5 Consistency Analysis for the Generation Task
If participants had explicit knowledge about some configurations, then we should be
able to observe consistent responding for such patterns in the generation task. We therefore
calculated the likelihood of correctly generating the target location to a given configuration,
given that all previous responses to that configuration were correct. If responding is
consistent, then this likelihood should increase across repetitions (=blocks), since this
would mean participants gave the same response to a configuration throughout. The
probability of a correct response on Block 1 (first presentation) was 0.30 across all
configurations. The probability of a correct response on Block 2—given a correct response
on Block 1—was 0.46. On Block 3, the probability of a correct response—given correct
responses on the previous 2 presentations—was 0.42. On Block 4, correct responses—
conditionalised on correct ones on the previous 3 presentations—occurred with probability
0.79. This pattern of increase suggests that participants adopted consistent response
strategies to the patterns they knew. By the fourth presentation, responding was highlyChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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accurate (bear in mind that the chance level is 0.25) for patterns that had evoked correct
responses earlier.
4.1.3 Discussion
This experiment directly replicated Experiment 1 of Chun and Jiang (2003), with
learning observed in the 24-block detection task through a marked facilitation in RT for
displays repeated throughout the experiment, and accompanied by no ability to correctly
generate the location of the transposed target letter for learned displays during 24 trials of
generation. Our assertion that it would be difficult to detect a small, but real, explicit effect
using this small number of trials was confirmed by the high generation accuracy that
emerged in our extended version of the generation task. When we calculated reliability
using a single block of trials in the generation task, we found that an individual block of
trials was not reliable on its own. Conversely, when this calculation was based on all 4
blocks of generation trials the measure showed high reliability. Chun and Jiang (2003)
found a numerically nonsignificant difference in generation ability between repeated (27%)
and Non-Repeated (20%) configurations using a 24-trial task. These authors acknowledged
that the null effect may have been due to noisy data; yet, they maintained their claim that
contextual cuing was a purely implicit process. When our observations about the reliability
of generation from Experiment 5 are applied, it is clear that a more plausible explanation
for their lack of effect is the low reliability of the measure rather than their participants’
actual lack of awareness. Overall, we argue that the shorter version of this task used in past
research may not provide a sound measure of participants’ true ability.
Another factor that may contribute to the low reliability of the generation measure
employed in past experiments is the lack of inherent strategic direction given to participantsChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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in this task. More specifically, the instructions for the generation task do not guide
participants to the best way of attaining the vague and seemingly daunting performance
goal of identifying the transformed target letter, using information they do not think they
possess. In contrast, the detection task imposes rigid response constraints—for example, to
search for the target letter as quickly as possible. Consequently, participants may use a
variety of response strategies in the generation task. This variation in task approach
decreases the consistency of responses given by participants, which could lead to low
reliability of the explicit measure (Buchner & Wippich, 2000).
An unexpected result of Experiment 5 was the finding that, on average, the
contextual cuing effect for a given participant was borne by only 1 or 2 configurations.
Rather than learning about all or most displays, it seems that a small number of displays
evoked fast responses. For a typical participant, many repeated configurations were
searched as slowly as novel ones.
In Experiment 1, we found that contextual cuing can be accompanied by conscious
awareness when the number of recognition trials included in the awareness test was
increased. Experiment 5 replicated this finding using a longer generation task, and showed
that the block format of this test increased its reliability and sensitivity. However, it is also
possible that the performance-based incentive included in Experiments 1 and 5 contributed
to the significant awareness effects obtained in these experiments. This would imply that
extending the generation task was not the only enhancement to the design of the explicit
test.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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4.2 Experiment 6
In this experiment, we asked whether the performance-based incentive included in
the instructions participants were given before the explicit memory tests in Experiments 1
and 5 might explain why, unlike previous contextual cuing experiments, we obtained an
association between learning and awareness. Although analyses of performance in
Experiment 5 showed that the block-design of the generation task enhanced the power and
reliability of the test to detect awareness, the addition of an incentive for correct responses
may have induced a motivational aspect which also enhanced performance.
Shanks and Johnstone (1999) found that participants exhibited high levels of
recognition in an SRT experiment, which directly contradicted previous findings of chance-
level recognition in a study by Reed and Johnson (1994) using an identical task. Shanks
and Johnstone attributed this difference in results to their inclusion of a reward for the
highest recognition score for their participants. Perhaps knowing that a reward is attached
to correct responses makes participants more inclined to engage in effortful conscious
retrieval. In addition, an incentive may also encourage participants to report contextual
information, which although accurate, is assigned low confidence or based on a partial
representation of a given display.
An additional goal of this experiment was to replicate the awareness effect obtained
in the previous experiment using a shorter detection task. Experiment 1 did show that
significant recognition ability could coincide with awareness after a 16 block detection task
in younger adults. However, as discussed previously, the validity of a recognition test as a
measure of awareness in contextual cuing is often questioned on the grounds that
performance may be influenced by familiarity judgments or perceptual fluency.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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4.2.1 Method
4.2.1.1 Participants
Seventy UCL undergraduates (53 women and 17 men) participated in the
experiment. Eight participants were recruited from the UCL Psychology subject pool and
given £5 compensation for their participation, while the remaining 62 participants took part
in the experiment as part of first-year laboratory class requirement. All participants were
between 18 and 23 years old (M = 19.86, SD = 1.29). Participants were assigned at random
to the Motivated (n = 21) or the Not Motivated (n = 49) experimental group.
4.2.1.2 Design
The detection task was a 2 x 2 x 16 (Motivation x Repetition x Block) mixed
factorial design, with Motivation (Motivated or Not Motivated) manipulated between-
subjects, and Repetition (Repeated and Non-Repeated) and Block (1-16) manipulated
within-subjects. The generation task was also 2 x 2 x 4 mixed factorial design (Motivation
x Repetition x Block).
4.2.1.3 Materials and Apparatus
These were identical to Experiment 5, except that that the length of the detection
task was shortened to include only 16 blocks of trials.
4.2.1.4 Procedure
This experiment differed from Experiment 5 only in the wording of the instructions
preceding the generation task. Recall that participants in past experiments have been
rewarded with 10 pence for each correct response made during the explicit test of
awareness. In this experiment, the Motivated group received an extended set of instructionsChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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before the generation task, similar to those presented by Shanks and Johnston (1999),
informing them that high performance would be rewarded with a £20 book token for the
top 5 high scorers. The instructions presented to the Non-Motivated group included no
mention of an extra incentive according to performance.
4.2.2 Results
4.2.2.1 Detection Task
As expected, participants demonstrated high overall response accuracy for detecting
the orientation of the target during the task (M = 98%, SE = 0.2). An ANOVA on
participants’ response accuracy by Repetition (Repeated vs. Non-Repeated) and motivation
group (Motivated or Not Motivated) also showed that there were no differences in response
accuracy between motivation groups (Motivated, M = 98%, SE = 0.4; Not Motivated, M =
98%, SE = 0.2), F(1, 68) = 0.63, p > .25. Response accuracy for Repeated and Non-
Repeated configurations was also similar within each group and between groups, F’s <
0.06, p’s > .81.
The ANOVA on detection task performance showed a reliable main effect of Block,
F(15, 1020) = 23.46, p < .001, which is evidence that acclimation to the task led to faster
responding overall. A main effect of Repetition, F(1, 68) = 18.77, p < .001, and a
Repetition x Block interaction, F(15, 1020) = 2.33, p < .003, also emerged from the
analysis, indicating that greater response efficiency developed for Repeated trials in relation
to Non-Repeated trials. There were no significant effects of or interactions with
Motivation, all F’s < 2.74, all p’s > .10, but of course the procedures for these groups did
not differ at this stage of the experiment.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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Figure 4.4. Median RTs (ms) over the 16 blocks of the detection task for Repeated and
Non-Repeated configurations of Not Motivated participants (top panel) and
Motivated participants (bottom panel); error bars show standard error of the mean.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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In Figure 4.4, there appears to be a difference in the magnitude of the contextual
cuing effect in the Motivated and Not Motivated groups by the end of the task. A repeated-
measures ANOVA of detection performance in the last 4 blocks of the task still showed an
overall main effect of Repetition, F(1, 68) = 26.78, p < .001, and Block, F(3, 204) = 2.88,
p < .04. The Repetition x Motivation interaction was marginally significant,
F(1, 68) = 3.16, p = .08, reflective of the development of a somewhat greater contextual
cuing effect in the Motivated group (Motivated, M = 131 ms, SE = 28; Not Motivated, M =
64 ms, SE = 21).
4.2.2.2 Generation Task
Each motivation group’s performance in the generation task is presented in Figure
4.5, and analysed using a repeated-measures ANOVA with Repetition (Repeated vs. Non-
Repeated) and Block (1-4) as within-subjects variables and Motivation (Motivated or Not
Motivated) as a between-subjects variable. Surprisingly, this analysis showed that
conscious awareness was not present in these participants, since neither the main effect of
Repetition, F < 1, nor the Repetition x Block interaction approached significance,
F(3, 204) = 1.47, p > .20. The Repetition x Block x Motivation interaction was marginal,
F(3, 204) = 2.33, p = .08, but there were no other indications that the Motivation
manipulation enhanced performance, all other F’s < 1.46, p’s > .22.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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Figure 4.5. Mean generation accuracy over the 4 blocks of the generation task for
Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations in the Not Motivated (top panel) and
Motivated (bottom panel) groups; error bars reflect standard error of the mean.
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons of generation accuracy between Repeated and Non-
Repeated configurations were non-significant for both motivation groups, all t’s < 1.72,Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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p’s > .10. Generation accuracy for Repeated configurations was numerically higher than
chance level (25%) in the Not Motivated group for the majority of the test, but these results
were only marginally significant in one-sampled comparisons of overall performance and
accuracy in Block 4 to chance, t(48) = 1.92, p = .06; t(48) = 1.96, p = .06, respectively; all
other t’s < 1.28, p’s > .20. None of the one-sampled comparisons of generation accuracy for
Repeated configurations to chance approached significance in the Motivated group, all
t’s < 1.53, p’s > .14.
All of the results from analyses thus far have failed to replicate the awareness effect
obtained using a generation test in younger participants in Experiment 5. To quantify
learning and awareness further and to draw comparisons to Experiment 5, we looked at
detection and generation performance for each configuration on an individual participant
basis using the procedures described in that experiment. We expected the number of
configurations driving the contextual cuing effect to be lower in this experiment, since
participants received fewer blocks of detection trials (16 versus 24 blocks in Experiment 5).
However, these analyses of individual data showed that contextual cuing occurred for
slightly more configurations on average for participants in this experiment than in
Experiment 5 (M = 1.87, SD = 1.84).
There were also no differences in the number of learned configurations between
participant groups (Motivated, M = 1.80, SD = 1.85; Not Motivated, M = 2.05, SD = 1.85),
t(68)= 0.52, p > .60. However, awareness for Repeated configurations only occurred for
about 1 configuration on average (Mdn = 1), when the criterion was determined by 75%
accuracy to a given Repeated configuration, with motivational instruction having no effectChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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on the number of configurations participants generated correctly (Motivated, M = 1.05,
SD = 1.32; Not Motivated, M = 1.16; SD = 1.01), t(68) = 0.40, p > .60.
Participants in the Not Motivated group showed a higher number of contextually
cued Repeated configurations than the number they showed conscious awareness of,
t(48) = 2.23, p < .03. This trend was also apparent in the Motivated group, but was only
marginally significant, t(20) = 1.99, p = .06.
4.2.2.3 Reported Awareness Results
Sixteen Motivated (76%) and 37 Not Motivated participants (76%) reported
noticing the repetition of configurations, χ
2 =0.004, p >.94, on average by Block 7 of the
task, t(51) = 0.09, p > .93. Only 4 Motivated and 3 Not Motivated participants relied upon a
memorization strategy after becoming aware of the repetitions. Nevertheless, as
consistently shown in past experiments, there were no significant interactions with reported
awareness when it was entered as a factor in an ANOVA of detection performance,
all F’s< 1, or generation performance, all F’s < 1.85, p’s > 14.
4.2.3 Discussion
This study investigated the effects of motivation on conscious awareness of
contextual cuing information during the generation task. Even though the motivated
individuals showed slightly higher levels of contextual cuing, they still demonstrated a lack
of awareness during the generation task just like participants who did not receive
instructions concerning a performance-based incentive. Therefore, we can conclude that the
inclusion of a reward in Experiment 5 was not the source of younger participants’
demonstration of awareness.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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The presence of above-chance levels of generation ability in Experiment 5 after a
24-block detection task versus the lack of a generation effect shown in the present
experiment when a 16-block detection task was used, implicates the length of the detection
task as a factor in obtaining participant awareness. Despite their lack of awareness using a
shorter detection task, the individual analysis indicated that participants in this experiment
showed contextual cuing for a greater number of configurations than in Experiment 5.
4.3 Experiment 7
If a unitary system of memory provides the best framework for understanding
contextual cuing, target location information should be readily available to conscious
retrieval mechanisms at the same point at which a contextual cuing effect is first observed.
In this experiment, we will attempt to examine conscious access to contextual cuing
knowledge in its earliest stages of behavioural expression. Traditionally in contextual cuing
experiments, the explicit test is given after a uniform number of blocks of detection trials.
Such a design does not allow us to determine whether the onset of contextual cuing and
awareness truly coincide, it only informs us of whether participants are able to consciously
access information after substantial levels of learning have occurred.
A further concern with a uniform length detection task is that administration of the
awareness test does not take account of individual differences in participants’ development
of contextual cuing. Imposing a rigid detection task length is inherently problematic,
because it assumes that all participants will acquire contextual information at a similar rate.
Hence the awareness test may be measuring participants at different stages in learning. If
we could quantify contextual cuing so that it is uniform across participants we may be able
to examine awareness against a consistent level of learning.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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In this experiment, the length of the detection task was tailored for each participant
according to the point at which contextual cuing first occurred, and then a generation test
was administered. If unconsciously acquired contextual cuing knowledge is exclusive to a
distinct implicit memory store, as proposed by the dual-systems theory, then the onset of a
learning effect in participants may not be accompanied by the ability to support conscious
retrieval as revealed in a generation task.
4.3.1 Method
4.3.1.1 Participants
Twenty-five University College London (UCL) undergraduates (15 women and 10
men) participated in the experiment. All participants were between the ages of 18 and 35
years old (M = 22.92, SD = 4.06), and naïve to the purpose of the experiment. All
participants received a baseline fee of £3 and 10 pence for each correct response during the
generation task.
4.3.1.2 Design
The number of trials a participant received in the detection task varied individually
according to the onset of contextual cuing, but all participants’ data included at least 4
blocks of detection trials (3 initial exposure blocks before the presence of contextual cuing
was tested, and a final block of trials after contextual cuing was shown). The awareness test
used in this task was a generation task identical in design to the versions used in
Experiments 3-6.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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4.3.1.3 Materials and Apparatus
The program used to present and create stimuli in this experiment was based on the
program from Experiment 6 but modified to present a titrated version of the detection task.
4.3.1.4 Procedure
This experiment used methods identical to the previous experiments, except that the
duration of the detection task was contingent upon each participant’s performance.
Commencing after the third block, a paired-samples t-test was computed to compare the
RTs of Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations at the end of each block of trials. If a
participant’s target detection in a given block was statistically faster for Repeated
configurations than for Non-Repeated configurations, it was inferred that contextual cuing
had occurred. These pairwise comparisons were assessed at the conservative p < .01 level
as a precaution against ending the task without a learning effect. An accuracy criterion of
20/24 correct responses was imposed to ensure contextual cuing was not contaminated by
inaccurate search performance. After expressing significant learning, participants received
1 more block of trials before the progression to the generation task. All participants
received at least 5 blocks, but no more than 16 blocks of detection trials.
4.3.2 Results
Five participants received all 16 blocks of trials, and did not show significant
contextual cuing when the difference between RTs for Repeated and Non-Repeated
configurations was averaged in their last 2 blocks of data. The aim of this experiment was
to see if information learned implicitly during the detection task was also accompanied byChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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explicit memory, hence the analyses only included the 20 participants who exhibited
evidence of contextual cuing by their last 2 blocks of the detection task.
4.3.2.1 Detection Task
All participants demonstrated high accuracy overall (M = 99%, SE = 0.21) with no
difference in accuracy between responses for Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations,
t(19) = 0.85, p > .40. Participants received an average of 10 (SD = 4.41) blocks of trials,
excluding the follow-up block, before meeting the fixed learning criterion.
A repeated-measures ANOVA with Repetition (Repeated and Non-Repeated) and
Block (1-4) as within-subjects variables was performed using RTs from each participant’s
last 4 blocks of target detection trials. Only the last 4 blocks of trials were included in the
ANOVA, since the number of blocks differed between participants and all participants
performed at least 4 blocks of trials. The Block effect was not significant over the last 4
blocks of the task, F < 1. There was a significant main effect of Repetition, F(1, 19) =
108.99, p < .001, and a Repetition x Block interaction, F(3, 57) = 7.30, p < .001,
demonstrating that participants exhibited a reliable contextual cuing effect by the end of the
detection task.
Notice, in Figure 4.6, that a reduction in contextual cuing is apparent during the last
block of the task. This smaller cuing effect follows a block with statistically substantial
cuing, t(19) = 8.57, p < .001, and is most likely a result of regression toward the mean
rather than an exhibition of less learning by participants.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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Figure 4.6. Means of the median RTs for Repeated and Non-Repeated Configurations
in the titrated detection task ranging from number of blocks preceding contextual
cuing to 1 block after the onset of contextual cuing; error bars show standard error of
the mean.
4.3.2.2 Generation Task
A repeated-measures ANOVA on generation performance showed no evidence that
participants were consciously aware of information from the titrated detection task, since
neither of the main effects of Repetition or Block, nor the Repetition x Block interaction
approached significance, all F’s < 1.53, p’s > .20. As shown in Figure 4.7, generation
accuracy in the Repeated condition numerically exceeded chance level in Block 3 of the
task, but not significantly, t(19) = 1.37, p > .18. Pairwise comparisons were also not
reliable, t(19) = 1.38, p > .18, and evidence of this trend was not sustained into Block 4.
To assess awareness and learning for individual Repeated configurations within
participants, we used the same procedure described in the 2 previous experiments.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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Contextual cuing was determined using RTs from Repeated configurations in each
participant’s last 4 blocks of detection trials and compared to a 99% confidence interval of
the mean of the Non-Repeated RTs from these last 4 blocks of the detection task. A
criterion of over 75% generation accuracy over the generation task was taken to signify
awareness. The titrated design allows us to examine performance at the onset of contextual
cuing.
Despite a lack of an overall difference in generation ability for Repeated and Non-
Repeated configurations, participants still showed evidence of reliable conscious retrieval
for 1 configuration on average (Mdn = 1), meaning that the number of configurations
generated in this experiment was similar to that of Experiment 5 where a reliable awareness
effect was present. More compellingly, on average participants showed contextual cuing for
more Repeated configurations (Mdn = 6) than any of our previous experiments, which
implies that the magnitude of the contextual cuing effect may be strongest in the earliest
stages of learning during the detection task. Direct comparisons confirmed that the number
of contextually cued configurations exceeded the number of generated configurations
(Detection, M = 5.55, SD = 1.43; Generation, M = 0.95, SD = 1.15), t(19) = 10.51, p < .001.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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Figure 4.7. Mean accuracy over 4 blocks of the generation task for Repeated and Non-
Repeated configurations administered after participants demonstrated a contextual
cuing effect during the detection task in Experiment 7; error bars show standard
error of the mean.
4.3.2.3 Reported Awareness
Twelve participants (60%) reported becoming aware of the pattern of configurations
during the experiment, and only 1 of these participants reported adopting a memorization
strategy after the repetitions became apparent. It is unlikely that contextual cuing was
affected by awareness, as the reported block of awareness (M = 6.3, SD = 2.45), and the
block of the experiment in which significant contextual cuing was shown,
(M = 10.4, SE = 1.07), did not overlap. Further similarity in learning was shown when the
repeated-measures ANOVA for the target detection task was re-analysed using Awareness
as a between-subjects variable, as all interactions with Awareness were nonsignificant,
all F’s < 1. Additionally, the length of the target detection task did not differ by reportedChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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awareness, t(18) = 0.12, p > .90. Generation performance, in a re-analysis with Awareness
included as a between-subjects variable, mirrored previous results in showing no significant
interactions between the other variables and Awareness, all F’s < 1.51, all p’s > .20. From
these analyses it is reasonable to conclude that performance on both tasks was unaffected
by participants’ discovery of the repetition of configurations in the experiment.
4.3.3 Discussion
The aim of this experiment was to ask whether conscious awareness of target
location could occur at the first manifestation of learning. Whereas participants in previous
experiments received the same number of trials during the detection task, in this experiment
participants were given the explicit test at the onset of learning. The majority of individuals
demonstrated contextual cuing within 16 blocks of trials; however, evidence of conscious
awareness was not present at the onset of learning.
The results of this experiment suggest that there may be a point at which knowledge
may be accessible only via unconscious facilitation mechanisms, and therefore not
immediately available to conscious processing, as a dual-systems perspective of memory
would suggest. However, it is still possible that when learning and awareness are measured
simultaneously, these abilities can coincide (unconscious acquisition and conscious
retrieval) within the same task.
4.4 Experiment 8
While Experiments 1 and 5 showed that contextual cuing knowledge is accessible to
both implicit and explicit memory in younger adults, Experiments 6 and 7 found that only
implicit memory resulted when participants were given a shorter or titrated learning task. InChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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Experiment 8, we attempted to resolve this contradiction by asking whether implicit and
explicit accessibility are synchronous when tested concurrently.
Younger adults in Experiment 1 also exhibited significant recognition ability,
whereas in Experiment 6, generation ability did not exceed chance even though participants
in these experiments received identical amounts of detection training. These results
underscore the differences between the generation and recognition tasks. Consequently,
both tests were included in the present experiment.
4.4.1 Method
4.4.1.1 Participants
Eighty participants (49 women and 31 men) were randomly assigned to the
recognition or generation test condition (n = 40 per group). All participants were between
the ages of 18 and 30 years old (M = 21.81, SD = 3.14), and naïve to the purpose of the
experiment. Roughly half of the participants were unpaid and took part for course credit,
whereas the remaining participants (n = 19, Generation; n = 14, Recognition) received a
baseline fee of £4 and an additional 10 pence for each correct response on explicit test
trials.
4.4.1.2 Design
All participants received an altered version of the detection task from Experiment 5,
which was a 2 x 16 (Repetition x Block) within-subjects design. The type of explicit task
was manipulated between-subjects. The Generation condition showed only Repeated
configurations using a 4-block repeated measures design and measured accuracy in
generating the target location on each trial, whereas the Recognition condition used the 2 x
2 (Repetition x Block) within-subjects design of the recognition test used in Experiment 1.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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4.4.1.3 Materials and Apparatus
The instructions and procedure described in Experiment 5 were also used for
creating and presenting all of the configurations of letters used for this experiment;
however, in order to concurrently measure implicit and explicit memory for the learned
contextual information, the detection and generation— or detection and recognition— tasks
were combined into a single procedure. In this new task, generation or recognition trials
were presented intermixed with detection trials within an experimental block. In order to
accommodate the new concurrent presentation format, the version of the generation task
used in Experiments 3, 4, 5 and 6 was altered. Generation trials only contained Repeated
configurations in order to preserve the 4-block design used previously, and also because
presenting Non-Repeated configurations as generation trials may interfere with the
expression of contextual cuing. The shorter 16 block detection task used previously was
also adopted in this experiment.
In the Generation group, there were 12 blocks of 28 concurrent trials (24 detection
and 4 generation). These 12 blocks of concurrent detection and generation trials were also
preceded by 3 blocks of just detection trials, since it would not have been useful to measure
generation performance before learning had occurred. The 16
th and final experimental
block was also made up solely of detection trials in order to see if contextual cuing
performance changed in the absence of concurrent explicit assessment.
In 3 blocks of concurrent detection and generation trials, the 12 generation trials
cycled through the entire set of repeated configurations. Thus, each individual Repeated
configuration was shown 4 times across the 12 concurrent blocks as generation trials. The 4
generation trials in each block contained a Repeated configuration with a target locationChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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from each quadrant of the screen so that random guessing within each block—and not just
across the task overall—would yield chance performance.
The experiment also included a Recognition group in which the generation trials
were substituted for a recognition task, used previously by Chun and Jiang (1998) and in
Experiment 1, to assess explicit memory. Participants were asked to discriminate between
Repeated configurations and Non-Repeated ones not presented previously during the
experiment. This version included 12 blocks of 24 detection trials and 4 recognition trials
presented concurrently, and like the Generation condition, these were preceded by 3 blocks
and followed by 1 block of pure detection trials. Two Repeated and 2 Non-Repeated
configurations were shown during the 4 recognition trials, so that over the 48 total trials
each Repeated configuration was shown twice. The Repeated configurations were the same
as those in the detection task, while a new set of 24 Non-Repeated configurations was
created for the recognition portion of the task. These new “Recognition Non-Repeated
configurations” were also generated using the procedures used to create those used on
detection trials.
4.4.1.4 Design
This new task with concurrent detection and generation/recognition trials began
identically to Experiment 5, with instructions to locate the letter T as quickly as possible
within the configuration of letter L’s, followed by 6 practice trials. After receiving 3 blocks
of 24 target detection trials, participants viewed another set of instructions introducing the
explicit test. In order to prevent response delays from inducing changes in finger positions
(since response requirements changed between trial types), the response keys for theChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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detection task were moved to the numeric keypad, with participants using the left and right
arrows on the “4” and “6” keys.
Participants in the Generation condition were told that in addition to seeing trials
requiring them to quickly locate the T in the display, the rest of the experiment would also
include some other trials (on which they would not be timed) with displays composed
entirely of Ls. They were informed that they had seen all of these displays previously
during the experiment, but now an L had been placed where a T would have occurred.
Their task was to try to guess which quadrant of the screen contained the “substitute” L,
and respond using the numeric keypad with the response layout mimicking the spatial
layout of the quadrants in the display, with the “7” and “9” keys corresponding to the top
left and right quadrants and the “1” and “3” keys corresponding to the bottom left and right
quadrants. These trials were preceded by a different orientation screen to alert participants
of the type of response required on the next trial. Prior to detection trials, participants were
shown a blank grey screen with a white dot in the centre for 1 sec to direct their attention to
the middle of the screen (as in all previous experiments reported), whereas the screen
shown before generation trials was a black screen with a centred white dot and a red
question mark in each quadrant of the display.
In the Recognition group, participants were also told that they would be shown
additional trials, but these configurations would appear similar to those seen during
detection trials (11 Ls and 1 T). However, on these trials, they were told that they could
take their time and decide whether or not they had seen that configuration previously during
the experiment. The “7” key on the numeric keypad signalled that they had seen the
display, or it was an “old” configuration, while the “9” key signalled they thought theChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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configuration was “new”. Participants were alerted to the type of trial to be shown—just as
in the generation condition—by the orientation screen.
Auditory feedback was still given on detection trials, but participants did not receive
performance feedback on generation or recognition trials. Participants also received a break
between blocks of at least 10 sec as in Experiment 5. After all 16 blocks of trials,
participants were informed of their performance on the explicit task. The new combined
task took about 1 hr to complete in both explicit test conditions.
4.4.2 Results
4.4.2.1 Detection Task
Participants in both explicit test conditions demonstrated high accuracy overall in
responding to the orientation of the T in the display (Generation, M = 97%, SE = 0.30;
Recognition, M = 99%, SE = 0.14); however, participants in the Recognition condition
systematically responded correctly more often, F(1, 78) = 15.68, p < .001. There were no
differences in response accuracy between Repeated and Non-Repeated displays overall or
within each explicit test condition, F’s < 0.18, p’s > .67, (Generation, Repeated, M = 97%,
SE =0.23 ; Non-Repeated, M = 97%, SE = 0.27; Recognition, Repeated, M = 99%, SE =
0.13 ; Non-Repeated, M = 99%, SE = 0.13)
Figure 4.8 shows the results of the detection task for participants in the Generation
and Recognition conditions. Slower detection performance in both Configuration
conditions was shown in Block 4, which coincides with the introduction of the concurrent
presentation of explicit trials in the task. A mixed ANOVA was performed on all of the
data with Repetition (Repeated vs. Non-Repeated) and Block (1-16) as within-subjects
variables and Explicit Test (Generation vs. Recognition) as a between-subjects variable.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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The results using a shortened detection task replicated performance in previous
experiments, with significant main effects of Repetition, F(1, 78) = 22.05, p < .001, and
Block, F(15, 1170) = 10.58, p < .001, and a non-significant Repetition x Block interaction,
F(15, 1170) = 1.13, p > .30. The significant main effect of Repetition is evidence that
contextual cuing occurred, since RTs for Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations were
not different in Block 1 for participants in either explicit test condition, Generation,
t(39) = 0.09, p > .90; Recognition, t(39) = 1.46, p > .15. There were no significant
interactions of Repetition or Block with the explicit test variable, all F’s < 0.87, all
p’s > .60; therefore, it can be concluded that equivalent contextual cuing developed in the
Generation and Recognition groups.
The dual-task requirement participants faced when asked to respond to both
detection and generation or recognition trials may have caused contextual cuing in
detection trials to be diminished. Greater cuing in Block 16—when only detection trials
were presented—would support this idea of the concurrent design of this experiment
suppressing the expression of cuing. Accordingly, cuing performance in blocks with and
without explicit test trials were compared by taking the difference in RTs between
Repeated and Non-Repeated configurations in Block 15—when detection trials were
included with generation or recognition trials—and comparing it to the difference in RTs
for configurations when just detection trials were shown in Block 16. There was no
difference in the amount of cuing demonstrated by participants between blocks in either
explicit test condition, Generation, t(39) = 1.32, p > .19; Recognition, t(39) = 0.39, p > .60,
so the concurrent presentation of the explicit trials alongside detection trials did not appear
to interfere with the contextual cuing effect.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
138
Generation
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Block
R
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
T
i
m
e
(
m
s
)
_
_
_
_
Repeated
Nonrepeated
Recognition
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Block
R
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
T
i
m
e
(
m
s
)
_
_
_
_
Repeated
Nonrepeated
Figure 4.8. Detection performance over 16 blocks for participants in the Generation
(n = 40) and Recognition (n = 40) conditions in Experiment 8. Individual points reflect
means of the median reaction time (ms); error bars show standard error of the mean.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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4.4.2.2 Generation Task
Generation was solely measured for Repeated configurations, so accuracy could
only be compared to chance performance. Accuracy averaged across all 12 blocks was
significantly higher than chance (M = 29%, SE = 1.5), t(39) = 2.57, p = .01. In order to
examine generation performance at different points during the task, accuracy was
calculated after each cycle of 12 generation trials presented across 3 blocks of concurrent
trials, which was equivalent to performance on 1 block of trials for Repeated configurations
from the generation task in Experiments 1, 5, and 6. A repeated-measures ANOVA was
performed using Generation Block (1-4) as a within-subjects variable and revealed no
effect for Generation Block on generation performance, F(3, 117) = 0.90, p > .40—which
as illustrated by Figure 4.7 shows that above-chance generation performance was sustained
throughout the task.
Interestingly, generation performance rose above chance as early as the first cycle
of trials (M = 30%, SE = 2.3), t(39) = 2.33, p < .03; however, as shown in Figure 4.9 this
seems to occur before contextual cuing itself was evident. A repeated-measures ANOVA
was performed on the detection trials corresponding to the presentation of this first cycle of
generation trials in Blocks 4-6 and showed a non-significant main effect of Repetition,
F(1, 39) = 0.27, p > .60, a significant main effect of Block, F(2, 78) = 9.89, p < .001, and a
non-significant Repetition x Block interaction, F(2, 78) = 0.43, p > .60, confirming that
generation ability preceded contextual cuing.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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Figure 4.9. Mean generation accuracy across cycles of generation trials in Experiment
8. One cycle is the point at which 12 generation trials are shown, or all Repeated
configurations have been displayed; error bars show standard error of the mean.
As with all previous experiments in this chapter, the number of Repeated
configurations showing contextual cuing was calculated for each participant, focusing on
data from the final 4 blocks. This analysis showed that, on average, contextual cuing
occurred for only 1 of the 12 Repeated configurations (M = 0.98, SD = 1.53). Across all
generation trials, when 3 of 4 correct quadrant responses (75%) were taken as an indicator
of awareness for an individual configuration, participants were aware of roughly the same
number of configurations (M = 0.98, SD = 1.05). However, there was a decrease in the
number of configurations learned overall in the concurrent task compared to Experiment 5,
which is most likely related to the shorter task duration used in this experiment.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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Correlations for each participant’s mean RT for each Repeated configuration over the last 4
blocks of the detection task and percent correct for the same configuration across all
generation trials showed a weak and non-significant relationship both at the individual
level, and overall, r = 0.02.
Finally, we divided participants into 2 groups according to their level of explicit
performance and then re-analysed their implicit performance. Participants with response
accuracy at or below chance level for Repeated configurations in the last cycle of
generation trials (i.e., across the last 12 generation trials in blocks 13-15 of the experiment)
were assigned to a no-awareness subgroup (n = 26), and their data from the last 4 blocks of
the detection task were re-calculated. Unlike Experiment 5, the main effect of Repetition
was highly significant, F(1, 25) = 13.15, p < .001. A comparable analysis using data from
the remaining sub-group of aware participants also revealed a (marginally) significant main
effect of Repetition, F(1, 13) = 4.17, p > .06. The difference between the groups was not
significant. We address the interpretation of this finding in more detail in the Discussion.
(Note that, because of the small number of awareness test trials in each block, there is
insufficient data to ask whether contextual cuing was reliable just for those configurations
showing chance-level explicit knowledge).
4.4.2.3 Recognition Task
Recognition ability was measured by calculating the hit and false-alarm rates for
responses to Repeated configurations from Non-Repeated configurations across recognition
trials. The hit rate (M = 0.50, SE = 0.03) was significantly higher than the false-alarm rate
(M = 0.41, SE = 0.03) across all 48 trials of the concurrent task, t(39) = 3.68, p < .001. In
order to see whether performance changed with the presentation of more detection trials,Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
142
the hit and false-alarm rates were also calculated after each cycle (equivalent to 6 blocks of
the concurrent trials), in which all 12 Repeated trials had been shown as recognition trials,
and the data are shown in Figure 4.10. After the first repetition, the hit rate (M = 0.42,
SE = 0.03) was not significantly higher than the rate of false-alarms (M = 0.41, SE = 0.03),
t(39) = 0.40, p > .60. Yet, by the second repetition, discrimination ability was evident with
a rise in hits (M = .58, SE = .03) versus false-alarms (M = 0.41, SE = 0.03), t(39) = 5.13,
p < .001.
The null result in the first cycle of recognition trials suggests that contextual cuing
may have occurred without awareness. In order to investigate this, a repeated-measures
ANOVA was performed on the corresponding detection trials in Blocks 4-9, and it showed
a non-significant main effect of Repetition, F(1, 39) = 2.26, p > .10, a significant main
effect of Block, F(5, 195) = 3.31, p < .008, and a non-significant Repetition x Block
interaction, F(5, 195) = 0.42, p > .80. Therefore, neither contextual cuing nor recognition
ability were present during the first half of the task.
An individual analysis of learning was performed to calculate the number of
configurations learned in detection and recognition. Participants showed contextual cuing
across Blocks 13-16 for approximately 1 Repeated configuration (M = 1.23, SD = 1.46),
which is similar to the amount learned in the generation task and in Experiment 5. For
recognition, each pattern was presented only twice across the entire experiment, so our
classification took a pattern as learned if the correct response was made on both trials. On
this basis, the number of configurations learned for recognition was M = 3.5, SD = 1.93,
although this should, of course, be interpreted with caution due to the small number of
observations per pattern. As before, the correlation between the mean RT to a RepeatedChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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configuration during the last 4 blocks of the experiment and the number of correct
recognition responses for the same configuration was calculated for each participant. These
correlations tended to be non-significant and their z-transformed mean was small
(M = 0.09).
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Figure 4.10. Hits and false alarms segmented by cycles of recognition trials in
Experiment 8. One cycle is equivalent to 24 recognition trials, comprising all 12
Repeated and 12 Non-Repeated configurations; error bars show standard error of the
mean.
Participants with no difference in recognition accuracy between Repeated and Non-
Repeated configurations in the last cycle of recognition trials (i.e., a negative or zeroChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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difference in hit and false-alarm rates across the last 12 Repeated and 12 Non-Repeated
patterns shown over Blocks 10-15 of the experiment) were assigned to a no-awareness
subgroup (n = 12), and their data from the detection task in Blocks 10-16 were re-
calculated. The main effect of Repetition, F(1, 11) = 5.06, p < .05, achieved significance. A
corresponding analysis on aware participants also revealed a main effect of Repetition,
F(1, 27) = 8.96, p < .006, meaning that contextual cuing was present regardless of reported
awareness.
4.4.3 Discussion
In sum, contextual cuing emerged after approximately 10 blocks of trials.
Participants had explicit knowledge of target location as indexed by generation and
recognition tests. Above-chance generation preceded contextual cuing (being significant
across the first 3 blocks) whereas recognition did not. Thus (1) at a group level, there is no
evidence of implicit contextual cuing preceding explicit awareness, and (2) generation
seems to be more sensitive than recognition. On the other hand, “unaware” participants did
show contextual cuing (addressed in the Overall Discussion).
4.5 Discussion of Experiments 5-8
The majority of contextual cuing experiments find that participants show facilitation
for displays they have been exposed to repeatedly during a visual search task (but see
Lleras & Von Muhlenen, 2004), which indicates that participants acquire some sort of
mental representation of these displays that they rely upon to aid their search. However, the
same individuals do not show evidence of being able to consciously use these
representations to support performance during a recognition or generation test. This
dissociation between unconscious learning and conscious retrieval has led researchers toChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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conclude that the contextual cuing phenomenon illustrates the existence of a purely implicit
processing mechanism. This chapter was concerned with examining whether the failure to
experimentally show conscious access to contextual cuing knowledge in previous
experiments was a true effect, or if it was a result of inadequate power and reliability in the
methods the previous studies used.
The first experiment presented in this chapter directly replicated Experiment 1 of
Chun and Jiang (2003), with learning observed in the 24-block detection task through a
marked facilitation in RT for displays repeated throughout the experiment, and
accompanied by no ability to correctly generate the location of the transposed target letter
for learned displays after 24 trials of generation. In addition, our assertion that it would be
difficult to detect a small, but real, explicit effect using this small number of trials was
confirmed by the high generation accuracy that emerged in our extended version of the
generation task. When we calculated reliability using a single block of trials in the
generation task, we found that an individual block of trials was not reliable on its own.
Conversely, when this calculation was based on all 4 blocks of generation trials the
measure showed high reliability. Chun and Jiang (2003) found a numerically nonsignificant
difference in generation ability between Repeated (27%) and Non-Repeated (20%)
configurations using a 24-trial task. These authors acknowledged that the null effect may
have been due to noisy data; yet, they maintained their claim that contextual cuing was a
purely implicit process. When our observations about the reliability of generation from
Experiment 5 are applied, it is clear that a more plausible explanation for their lack of effect
is the low reliability of the measure rather than their participants’ actual lack of awareness.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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Overall, we argue that the shorter version of this task used in past research may not provide
a sound measure of participants’ true ability.
A factor that may contribute to the low reliability of the generation measure is the
lack of inherent strategic direction given to participants in this task. More specifically, the
instructions for the generation task do not guide participants to the best way of attaining the
vague and seemingly daunting performance goal of identifying the transformed target letter,
using information they do not think they possess. In contrast, the detection task imposes
rigid response constraints—for example, to search for the target letter as quickly as
possible. Consequently, participants may use a variety of response strategies in the
generation task. This variation in task approach decreases the consistency of responses
given by participants, which could lead to low reliability of the explicit measure (Buchner
& Wippich, 2000).
An unexpected result of Experiment 5 was the finding that, on average, the
contextual cuing effect for a given participant was borne by only 1 or 2 configurations.
Rather than learning about all or most displays, it seems that a small number of displays
evoked fast responses. For a typical participant, many repeated configurations were
searched as slowly as novel ones.
In Experiment 6, contextual cuing still emerged when a shorter 16-block detection
task was used, though generation ability did not exceed chance. Despite having less
exposure to predictive configurations and thus less opportunity to gather information during
the detection task, the learning effect still appeared to be based on 1 or 2 configurations.
Evidence of conscious awareness was not obtained in this experiment, even though a more
reliable and powerful blocked-design generation task was employed.Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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Recall that Experiment 1 included the same abbreviated detection task, but
significant recognition ability accompanied contextual cuing in younger participants.
Experiment 6’s findings of null awareness when a generation task is used highlights the
differences between these explicit tests and, further, suggests that only generation ability is
affected by the reduction in task duration. Moreover, the fact that a shorter implicit task
adversely affects participants’ performance on the generation test implies that unconscious
processes may have preferential access to the informational trace formed in contextual
cuing.
Experiment 7 allowed us to examine whether contextual cuing and conscious
awareness resulted when the generation task was administered at the first indication that
contextual cuing was present during the detection task. In doing so, the titrated design of
the task also enabled us to take into account individual differences in the amount of
exposure necessary for acquiring contextual cuing. The majority of participants showed
reliable contextual cuing in fewer than 16 blocks of detection trials, but showed no
indication that this contextual cuing information was consciously accessible. Generation
ability did not exceed chance, yet the number of configurations in which participants
demonstrated consistently accurate responses was similar to previous experiments where an
awareness result was obtained.
It was also surprising that the learning effect in Experiment 7 was composed of
faster responses to about half of the Repeated configurations on average, which was a
larger number than was demonstrated during the generation task. Analyses of Experiments
5 and 6, where longer detection tasks were used, showed that the learning effect was made
up of detection facilitation for markedly fewer configurations. Presumably, the initialChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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memory trace of all of these configurations is of low strength at the onset of contextual
cuing. Perhaps there is a great deal of fluctuation in the amount of information participants
are able to retain throughout the detection task, so as the quality of the initial representation
of certain configurations increases over the duration of the detection task there is greater
competition for continued storage in memory. However, search facilitation would continue
to develop for the select few configurations that were sustained successfully into higher
quality representations in memory and continued to support the contextual cuing effect that
results by the end of the task. The instability of contextual cuing knowledge is also
demonstrated in the noisiness of the learning effect from block to block that is shown
traditionally in the detection task.
In light of these results, proponents of a dual-systems account of memory might
rationalize the awareness effect obtained in Experiments 1 and 5 as an indication that
contextual cuing in these experiments was supported by a memory source that can only be
operated on using conscious processes. Experimenters holding this view assume any
informational representations yielded when an awareness effect is present are definitively
neither implicit, nor a true demonstration of contextual cuing. Consequently, these
experimenters also often adopt a practice of discounting data from participants showing
awareness (subjective or objective) on these grounds (Howard et al., 2004).
This binary interpretation of learning and memory can be challenged not only
because the argument is circular (since it assumes that the detection task is inherently
process pure) but also because it is clear that participants showing an awareness effect were
not especially subjectively aware or deliberate in their approach to performing the detection
task to indicate reliance on a purely explicit strategy. Although subjective measures ofChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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awareness are often poor gauges of actual conscious knowledge (Dienes, Broadbent, &
Berry, 1991; Shanks & Johnstone, 1998; Willingham, Greeley, & Bardone, 1993), they do
allow us to infer something about what participants gathered about their own intentionality
in performing the task. Reported awareness during the series of questions before the
explicit task was similar across experiments regardless of participants’ awareness on the
explicit tests, and (except in one of the experiments) reported awareness was not a factor
affecting contextual cuing performance.
In Experiment 8 we asked whether participants’ awareness coincided with their
implicit processing by presenting trials from both the explicit and implicit tasks
concurrently. Although Experiments 5 and 6 showed evidence of learning without
awareness, the online measure of awareness in Experiment 8 provides a more sensitive test
as it allowed for concurrent assessment. Participants were both able to respond faster to
repeated configurations on detection trials and successfully recognize or accurately
generate the target location of altered repeated configurations during the new concurrent
task; therefore, it seems that conscious availability of these contextual representations
revealed on generation or recognition trials coincides with the “unconscious” demonstration
of contextual cuing during detection trials.
Experiment 8 also addressed the difference in sensitivity for contextual cuing
information between the 2 explicit tasks used in contextual cuing experiments. The first
experiment using this paradigm by Chun and Jiang (1998) included a recognition task in
which discrimination judgments are made on the basis of the participant’s sense of
familiarity of the displays. Some have argued that in order to conclude that the information
supporting contextual cuing is not available to awareness, the test of explicit memory mustChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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try to engage the same source driving efficient visual search during the detection task (i.e.,
cuing of locations by the distracter context). It is not obvious that recognition judgments,
based on display familiarity, achieve this. Chun and Jiang (2003) addressed this limitation
by introducing the generation task which requires participants to search the display for the
missing target letter and then to respond to its location, hence closely matching the
demands of the detection task and thus in principle making it more sensitive to contextual
cuing knowledge. This speculation was confirmed in Experiments 5 and 8. Participants in
the generation group showed awareness earlier than those in the recognition group in
Experiment 8, whereas participants in the generation conditions of Experiment 5 showed a
roughly equal number of learned individual configurations between the detection and
generation tasks.
A somewhat surprising result was obtained with the concurrent measurement test
design. The generation group showed awareness of contextual knowledge before the
contextual cuing effect was evident on detection trials, meaning that awareness seems to
have preceded the expression of learning during visual search. Parenthetically, the same
outcome has been found in the SRT task (Perruchet, Bigand, & Benoit-Gonin, 1997;
Shanks & Johnstone, 1999). Some would argue that the dual-task requirement may have
interfered with the expression of contextual cuing knowledge. We doubt that this is a viable
explanation, since detection performance did not improve when only detection trials were
presented during the last block of the experiment. We believe that the generation effect
emerges before contextual cuing because the explicit test is intrinsically more sensitive than
the implicit test. In Experiment 5, a reliable contextual cuing effect was not demonstratedChapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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until Block 12 of the detection task, whereas in Experiment 8, a significant overall
generation effect was shown after 4 blocks of trials.
Additionally, we address the issue of selecting participants or configurations post
hoc on the basis of their explicit knowledge and examining performance on the associated
implicit test. Numerous studies have analysed performance in this way by computing the
implicit task performance only of participants scoring at or below chance on an explicit
measure, or only for trials on which explicit performance was at chance. Here, analyses of
contextual cuing in samples of “unaware” participants in both conditions of Experiment 8
(though not of those in all previous experiments) showed reliable learning effects.
Likewise, configurations in Experiment 5 which were associated with chance-level
generation also showed reliable learning effects. But we argue that these findings still do
not constitute clear evidence of implicit learning. The reason is that such results are also
predicted by single-system models which do not recognize the implicit-explicit distinction
(Shanks & Perruchet, 2002; Shanks, Wilkinson, & Channon, 2003) and which assume that
awareness is a necessary concomitant of learning. Suppose that there is a single knowledge
base which controls performance both in an implicit test, such as contextual cuing, and in
an explicit test, such as generation. Suppose also, however, that independent sources of
noise or error contribute to each performance measure. Under such circumstances, it will
inevitably be the case that simulated participants selected after the fact as scoring at or
below chance on the explicit measure will score above chance on the implicit measure
(Perruchet & Amorim, 1992), and likewise for configurations selected post hoc on the same
basis. Indeed these models can even predict correlations of zero between implicit and
explicit measures despite them arising from the same underlying representation (Berry,Chapter 4: Awareness in Contextual Cuing
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Henson, & Shanks, 2006; Kinder & Shanks, 2003). We believe that, for this statistical
reason, this form of analysis rarely supports the inferences that are drawn from it.
Note that we are not arguing for a causal role of awareness in learning. Such a
conclusion would not be warranted on the basis of our findings. An alternative possibility is
that learning and awareness are both consequences of a common underlying cause such as a
particular type of mental representation (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002), yielding the slightly
weaker conclusion that awareness is a necessary condition for learning.
This research underlines the importance of evaluating the empirical reliability of
cognitive measures in these types of experiments. When attempting to demonstrate
dissociations between measures of processing, adequate consideration must be given to
ensure that both tests have enough power to statistically obtain the effect in question, and
caution must be exercised in assuming that the same information is being measured
between the tasks. The experiments in this chapter show that previous dissociations
between learning and awareness in contextual cuing may have emerged because of an
insensitive test of awareness which clearly calls for a revised interpretation of the
contextual cuing phenomenon.
In conclusion, the results observed in this chapter suggest that an explanation based
on independent implicit and explicit systems is not necessary to account for contextual
cuing. Therefore, the lack of contextual cuing ability in older adults in the two previous
chapters may be symptomatic of general loss of memory function associated with cognitive
ageing, rather than reflective of impairment to a specific implicit system.153
5 How Does Cognitive Ageing Affect
Contextual Cuing?
The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate the effects of cognitive ageing in implicit
learning and memory using a contextual cuing task. Performance on implicit tasks have
been promoted as invulnerable to age-related cognitive decline, in contrast to performance
on explicit tasks where older adults exhibit known impairments. This idea is heavily
entrenched in theories of memory which assume completely separate implicit and explicit
systems whose operating mechanisms are supported by different areas of the brain. This
final chapter summarizes key findings of the experiments reported in the previous chapters,
and addresses possible reasons why conclusions from previously published research may
differ in many respects to our own. It will be argued that implicit processing is not immune
to the effects of cognitive ageing. Possible explanations for these age-related impairments
will be discussed in light of the empirical evidence put forth in this thesis and existing
theories of learning and memory.
5.1 Contextual Cuing is Not Age Invariant
Experiment 1 in Chapter 2 compared implicit learning in a contextual cuing task in
healthy older adults to younger adults, and found that older adults did not learn as well as
younger adults during the detection task. This finding conflicts with Howard et al.’s (2004)
conclusion that performance in the contextual cuing task is age invariant.
The basis of Howard et al.’s (2004) claim, as discussed in Chapter 2, was the lack of an
interaction with age and the other indicators of contextual cuing in an overall ANOVA of
the data. In Experiment 1 we sought to avoid this practice of relying on a single result, letChapter 5: How Does Cognitive Ageing Affect Contextual Cuing?
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alone a null result, and analysed a variety of behavioural measures before coming to a
conclusion. The statistical interaction between age and contextual cuing, that was not
present in Howard et al., did emerge in the overall ANOVA of data in our Experiment 1.
An analysis of the presence of cuing within each epoch also showed that younger adults
sustained a significant contextual cuing effect continuously throughout the last half of the
detection task, while older adults did not show an effect at any point in the task.
Furthermore, when the amount of contextual cuing was quantified using a proportional
learning measure the older adults’ mean cuing score was not only significantly lower than
the younger adults’, but also was not even greater than zero.
It is important to mention that these age-related performance differences resulted
when performance was compared after only 16 blocks of detection trials, whereas Howard
et al.’s (2004) original study employed 30 blocks of trials. This inconsistency in results
implies that the number of trials during the detection task seems to be tied to the strength of
the memory for a given configuration. Yet when older adults in our Experiment 3 received
a direct replication of Howard et al.’s 30-block detection task, they still failed to show
statistical evidence of a contextual cuing effect. As with the individual experiments, a
combined analysis of the 70 older participants tested in Experiments 1, 3, and 4 (compared
with 36 in Howard et al.’s Experiment 1) yields a nonsignificant final-epoch contextual
cuing effect of 26 msec [t(69) = 0.72, p > .47; exactly the same number (35) of individuals
showed a positive cuing effect (i.e., Repeated faster than Non-Repeated) as showed a
negative cuing effect]. Across all younger participants in our experiments in Chapters 2 and
3, the cuing effect (M = 107 msec) is highly reliable [t(187) = 4.85, p < .001; a positive
cuing effect was shown by 127 of these and a negative effect by 60, with one showing anChapter 5: How Does Cognitive Ageing Affect Contextual Cuing?
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effect of 0 msec]. On this point, our results are in less sharp disagreement with those of
Howard et al. (2004). As discussed previously, a numerical trend for weaker contextual
cuing in older compared to younger participants was clear in their data.
Two other studies have reported the occurrence of contextual cuing in healthy older
adults of a similar age range to those tested in this thesis when they were included as a
control group in examinations of contextual cuing in other settings (Negash, et al., 2007;
Peterson et al., 2002). In this respect, proposing that age-related impairments occur in
contextual cuing might be viewed as an outlier in relation to the existing literature; but
upon further investigation of the conclusions drawn by the aforementioned studies it is
evident that they do not actually contradict the findings presented in this thesis.
Peterson et al. (2002) compared a group of older individuals (n = 12) to a younger
group using a contextual cuing task after a 60-block detection task to examine the changes
to attentional guidance with age, and found no age effects to suggest performance
differences. Peterson et al. (2002) also based their conclusion, like Howard et al. (2004),
entirely on null interactions with age in an ANOVA of detection performance, but their
small sample size is likely to have lowered the power of their analysis in detecting a
between-groups performance difference. Moreover, the older group’s data were never
presented alone to confirm that a contextual cuing effect would still be obtained in an
individual ANOVA, and the supposed presence of contextual cuing in older adults occurred
only after an extraordinarily high number of detection trials. More compellingly, younger
and older adults in Peterson et al. (2002) also showed similar degrees of recognition on an
awareness test. This provides a possible explanation for their results, since it is common for
younger adults to perform much better than older adults on measures of explicit memory. ItChapter 5: How Does Cognitive Ageing Affect Contextual Cuing?
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is possible that the older adults relied upon conscious processing to show a contextual
cuing effect during the detection task, but it is more plausible that the ANOVA of the
recognition was also not powerful enough to show a difference in recognition performance.
Given the concerns outlined above, the evidence provided in Peterson et al. (2002) that
contextual cuing occurs normally in an older population is questionable, and can most
likely be attributed to the low power of their study.
Negash et al. (2007) looked at genetic contributors to the development of Mild
Cognitive Impairment (MCI) by comparing two groups of healthy older adults who differed
only in that one group was composed entirely of carriers of a gene called Apolipoprotein
(ApoE) that is thought to be a predictor of development of MCI. Older participants who
were non-ApoE carriers did show contextual cuing, while older ApoE carriers and MCI
patients did not develop this ability, which led Negash et al. (2007) to propose that the
contextual cuing task could prove to be a useful tool in predicting later onset of MCI after
further longitudinal examination. The occurrence of learning in older non-ApoE carriers is
at variance with the results included in this thesis, but since a younger control group was
not included in this study it is not possible to determine if age was also a factor in
contextual cuing performance. That being said, Negash et al. also suggested that cognitive
ageing produces marked performance difficulties on this task in healthy older adults, albeit
of a certain genetic make-up; therefore, there is no reason to view these findings as in
disagreement with our own.
There was considerable evidence from the experiments presented in Chapters 2 and
3 to establish that cognitive ageing negatively influences contextual cuing in otherwise
healthy older adults. This conclusion stands contrary to other studies reported in theChapter 5: How Does Cognitive Ageing Affect Contextual Cuing?
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contextual cuing literature (Howard et al. 2004; Peterson et al. 2002). This variance in
results draws attention to the fact that previous studies’ claims that contextual cuing is age
invariant depended entirely on null age effects in one analysis, and thereby underscores the
importance of thoroughly examining data for possible underlying performance differences.
5.2 Contextual Cuing and Processing Speed
In addition to showing little evidence of contextual cuing, older adults were also
consistently slower than younger adults in Experiment 1. While it has been suggested that
poor performance on cognitive tasks in older adults may be explained by a general slowing
that develops with age (Salthouse, 1985; 1996), the results reported in Chapter 3 suggest
that older adults’ slower response speeds cannot account for their poor contextual cuing
ability.
The logic of the design of Experiments 2 and 3 was that if processing speed is a
factor contributing to performance in the contextual cuing task, then slowing down
responses in younger adults should produce learning deficits that are similar to those
demonstrated by older adults in Experiment 1. Manipulating the offset of the distracter
letter stimuli and the contrast ratio of the display was viewed as more complex than simply
slowing down the pace of the task for younger adults in Chapter 3. The intention of these
manipulations was to attempt to simulate the actual processing lag that older adults
experience. Yet despite younger adults’ slower response latencies after viewing a low
display contrast or offset distracter letters, there was no evidence from Experiments 2 and 3
to suggest that younger adults’ contextual cuing performance was as poor as older
participants’ when they were slower to respond. When younger adults received tailored
manipulations of the distracter letters to customise target-distracter similarity in ExperimentChapter 5: How Does Cognitive Ageing Affect Contextual Cuing?
158
3, it did negatively affect learning, but only in relation to other younger participants from
Experiment 1 who did not receive task adjustments to alter their response latencies.
Correspondingly, when older adults’ responding was made faster by altering the letter
stimuli in Experiment 4, to simulate the response latencies of younger adults, it did not lead
to the attenuation of their contextual cuing impairments.
Traditionally, examinations of processing speed also attempt to establish a statistical
link between measures of cognitive functioning and standardized measures of processing
speed. According to Processing Speed Theory, a positive relationship between these
variables is expected with advancing age. Correlational analyses between processing speed
and proportional cuing were performed for Experiments 3 and 4; however, neither
experiment showed a relationship of this nature between processing speed and contextual
cuing in older adults or younger adults. The only sign of a correlation occurred in the group
of younger adults who were given a tailored offset manipulation to slow down their
response latencies in Experiment 3, but, contrary to what is predicted by Processing Speed
Theory, this correlation was negative and only marginally significant.
Howard et al. (2007) adopted an empirical approach similar to Experiments 2 and 3
in their investigation of the contributions of processing speed to age-related differences in
sequence learning. By degrading the screen-contrast ratio and increasing the response-to-
stimulus intervals, Howard et al. (2007) were able to slow down responding in younger
adults in an SRT task. Similar to the findings of Experiment 3, younger adults’ speed
impediments in Howard et al. (2007) impaired sequence learning performance in relation to
younger controls—though not older adults. Interestingly, the low contrast condition
included was found to impair only the expression of sequence learning, since the learningChapter 5: How Does Cognitive Ageing Affect Contextual Cuing?
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effect that resulted was greatly improved in a follow-up block of trials presented at a higher
contrast. Howard et al. (2007) also tried to boost older adults’ sequence learning to the level
shown by younger adults by extending the training phase they underwent, but this attempt
was also unsuccessful.
Other attempts to relate implicit learning measures to processing speed in this
manner have also been unsuccessful (McGeorge et al., 1997; Reber, Walkenfield, &
Hernstadt, 1991). Salthouse et al. (1999) reconciled this evidence against Processing Speed
theory by asserting that the low reliability of implicit learning tasks obscures the ability to
detect relationships between implicit measures and other cognitive variables (e.g.,
processing speed and age), but acknowledged that this criticism does not stand up against
the findings of Hultsch et al. (1991) and Small, Hultsch, and Masson (1995). Hultsch et al.
(1991) and Small et al. (1995) found that stem-completion tasks possessed a moderate level
of reliability, but still only found weak relationships between learning and standardised
measures of cognitive functioning. However, Salthouse et al. qualified the application of
Processing Speed theory to these results by classifying the experiments in Hultsch et al.
(1991) and Small et al. (1995) as assessments of implicit memory, and suggested that
“measures of implicit memory are more likely to reflect a qualitatively different form of
processing than measures of implicit learning” (p.17). Such a statement controversially
assumes entirely separable implicit learning and implicit memory mechanisms, and also
implies that implicit memory is not influenced by slower processing speed while implicit
learning is. If implicit learning is involved, surely a person taking a dual-systems
perspective would agree that retrieval of this knowledge is also implicit, so it seemsChapter 5: How Does Cognitive Ageing Affect Contextual Cuing?
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contradictory in this case to propose that learning could be degraded due to processing
speed but memory for this learned information would remain unaffected.
Actually the nature of the criticisms above draws attention to the difficulty previous
experiments have faced in their application of theories of cognitive slowing to implicit
tasks, which ultimately leads to the conclusion that cognitive slowing may not be a suitable
explanation for older adults’ learning on tasks of this nature. Neither of the criticisms above
of implicit memory tasks can be applied to the contextual cuing task. Although the presence
of awareness depended on the circumstances of the detection task, in Chapter 4 it was clear
that contextual cuing should not be portrayed as an example of a purely implicit task. The
findings reported in Chapters 2 and 3 established that both the detection task and the
explicit tests were reliable and powerful enough to demonstrate age-related differences in
performance, so if a statistical relationship existed between measures of contextual cuing
and processing speed it should have become evident in Chapter 3. Therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that cognitive slowing does not influence the contextual cuing
deficits that are observed in older adults.
5.3 The Role of Awareness in Contextual Cuing
In addition to an age effect in baseline response latencies, in Experiment 1 there was
also a difference in performance on the awareness test. While younger adults were able to
consciously recognize Repeated configurations from the detection task during the explicit
recognition task, older adults showed no such ability. This result is particularly striking
when it is coupled with the absence of both contextual cuing and recognition in older adults
in Experiment 1, because it contradicts the generally accepted notion that contextual cuing
knowledge is subject solely to implicit processing. If awareness plays a significant role inChapter 5: How Does Cognitive Ageing Affect Contextual Cuing?
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contextual cuing, it becomes possible that the explicit memory decrements that occur in
healthy ageing individuals may be linked to their inability to demonstrate contextual cuing
in Chapters 2 and 3.
The presence of an awareness effect in the younger adults is controversial, since
contextual cuing is traditionally classified as driven purely by implicit learning (Barnes et
al., 2008; Bennett, et al., 2008; 2009; Chun & Jiang, 1998; 1999; 2003; Chun & Phelps,
1999; Howard et al., 2004; 2006; Huang, 2006; Manns & Squire, 2001; Nabeta et al., 2003;
Peterson et al., 2002; Pollman & Manginelli, 2009; Schankin & Schubo, 2009; van Asselen
et al., 2009). Experiments 5 and 8 established that this variance in results was most likely
caused by the fact that the awareness tests in this thesis adopted a block-design with a
larger number of test trials, which increased the power and reliability of both the generation
and recognition tests and thereby improved the ability to detect participants’ awareness of
contextual cuing knowledge.
That being said, the fact that contextual cuing was accompanied by awareness in
Experiments 1, 5, and 8 but occurred without awareness under shorter detection task
conditions in Experiments 6 and 7 is consistent with the graded, dynamic, perspective of
implicit learning and conscious awareness proposed by Cleeremans and colleagues
(Cleeremans, 1997; 2006; Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998; Cleeremans &
Jimenez, 2002). According to this account, awareness of implicit knowledge occurs on a
continuum with consciousness described as merely an aspect of a representation that is
dictated by the quality or strength of the representation. Presumably, a longer detection task
allows for the development of stronger higher-quality representations of configurations
which eventually lead to conscious access to this knowledge. Though such an argument hasChapter 5: How Does Cognitive Ageing Affect Contextual Cuing?
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great overlap with the principles of a single-system view of memory in its belief that an
association between implicit and explicit learning exists -- which deems the need for
making a distinction between a representation as implicit or explicit at any given point
unnecessary -- the acceptance of Cleeremans’ argument would still be a concession to those
in support of a traditional single-systems view (Shanks & St. John, 1994). The premise that
delineates the dynamic approach to memory from a single-systems account is its support of
the idea that unconsciously encoded information can be less accessible, or inaccessible at
some point, to the conscious system. From this perspective, it is clear that the effects of
cognitive ageing extend beyond an explicit processing deficit.
5.4 Limitations and Future Directions
The aim of this thesis was to examine how cognitive ageing affects contextual
cuing, and not specifically to promote the idea that contextual cuing is absent entirely in
healthy older adults. Yet, given that contextual cuing was not shown at any point in any of
the analyses of older participants’ performance in Experiments 1, 3, or 4, there was little
evidence from these data to suggest that the older participants included in this thesis were
capable of learning the predictive relationships entailed in contextual cuing. It is unclear
why we have repeatedly failed to obtain contextual cuing in older groups (Experiment 1,
Older group; Experiment 3, Easy Detection Older Group, Difficult Detection Older group)
whereas Howard et al. (2004) did obtain such an effect.
Perhaps, as discussed in the General Discussion of Chapter 3, the older adults in our
Experiments 1,3, and 4 who performed poorly on the contextual cuing task were inherently
different from the older participants in Howard et al. (2004). The participant-recruiting
practices in our experiments were based on that of Howard et al.’s, with older individualsChapter 5: How Does Cognitive Ageing Affect Contextual Cuing?
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required to answer a series of questions about their health prior to participation to ensure
that they were in good health and free from cognitive disorders. Yet it is possible that
participants could have passed this screening despite suffering from an undiagnosed
neurological condition (e.g. dementia). This is an acknowledged weakness of many
memory studies that must rely on self-report measures of health, because they do not have
the resources to monitor each participant’s medical history, neurological health, and
longitudinal memory data.
A discussion of the statistical power of the design of our experiments in detecting
contextual cuing in general, as well as questioning the magnitude of the age-related
difference shown in Experiment 1 may also provide further reason why the overall
conclusions of this thesis differed from those of Howard et al. (2004). It is possible that the
statistical power to detect reliable contextual cuing was compromised when an abbreviated
detection task was used, but if this was case, we would not have expected the younger
individuals in Experiment 1 to demonstrate such a large contextual cuing effect by the last
epoch of the task (d = 0.74). A subsequent analysis of the power of the study showed that
the sample size (n = 20) was extremely powerful (0.94) in detecting a contextual cuing
effect of this size. Therefore, if older adults are just as capable of showing contextual cuing
as younger adults, we would have expected to have seen an effect using this experimental
design in Experiment 1, 3, and 4. That being said, the probability of detecting resulting
performance differences that occurred between the older and younger groups (d = 0.63) in
Experiment 1 was still only 62% when each group is made up of 20 participants. Howard et
al. (2004) included more participants (n = 30) than we included in Experiment 1, which
presumably made their study more powerful than ours. It is still important to exerciseChapter 5: How Does Cognitive Ageing Affect Contextual Cuing?
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caution when interpreting whether null effects signify a true lack of a difference in
performance, or merely a product of a lower power design. To minimize concerns about
statistical power, it is generally accepted to include a number acceptable to achieve an
effect 85% of the time, which would require each group to be made up of at least 37
participants to obtain a difference in performance with a similar effect size of the age-
related difference shown in Experiment 1.
Issues of statistical power and study design are also a relevant concern when the
above logic is applied to the experiments in Chapter 3, where the processing speed theory
of memory was tested using between groups comparisons. Clearly these studies relied
somewhat, though not solely, upon null statistical effects as evidence for making overall
conclusions. The premise of these studies was that slowing down younger adults should
noticeably impair contextual cuing, meaning that an ad hoc assumption would speculate
that this resulting difference in contextual cuing between the younger control group and the
slower experimental groups in Experiment 2 would be similar to difference between the
older and younger groups in Experiment 1 if slower processing speed accounts fully for
older adults’ poor contextual cuing. Experiment 2 included 40 participants in each group;
and therefore, exceeded the number of participants necessary for an adequate amount of
statistical powerful to detect a possible difference between conditions when effect size is
similar to that which resulted in Experiment 1.
Our conclusion that the minimal contextual cuing observed in our older participants
is not attributable to their overall slow responding is bolstered by the findings of three
previous studies that employed similar speed manipulations to alter baseline RT in
contextual cuing in younger individuals. Chun and Phelps (1999), Howard et al. (2004,Chapter 5: How Does Cognitive Ageing Affect Contextual Cuing?
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Experiment 2), and Manns and Squire (2001) all found that artificially slower younger
participants continued to show robust contextual cuing, as seen in Experiment 2 here.
Where Chun and Phelps (1999) and Manns and Squire (2001) disagreed was in relation to
the effects of medial temporal lobe damage on contextual cuing. Chun and Phelps reported
that individuals with amnesia failed to learn contextual associations, and concluded that
medial temporal brain structures are vital to this form of learning. Chun and Phelps’
conclusion is controversial because it runs counter to the assumption that the task evokes a
form of implicit learning. That pattern is similar to the one observed here for the effects of
aging. Manns and Squire (2001) found that amnesic participants with damage limited to the
hippocampal formation showed intact learning, while only amnesic participants with more
extensive damage to the medial temporal and lateral temporal lobes were impaired. Manns
and Squire therefore concluded that the task is implicit, insofar as damage to the main
structure controlling explicit learning/memory – the hippocampus – does not affect
contextual cuing. Whatever the precise roles of the hippocampus versus other medial
temporal lobe structures –our findings are not a direct measure of neural activation;
however, they are also not inconsistent with either of these studies if we assume that lower
levels of contextual cuing in older individuals are linked to impaired medial temporal lobe
(rather than purely hippocampal) functioning.
Instead of limiting all of the memory decrements that result with age as derived
from damage to a specific explicit memory system, an alternative view has emerged that
describes memory deficits as a consequence of cognitive ageing or amnesia depending on
whether task performance depends on associative processing, as opposed to consciousness
(Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996; Chun, 2005; Naveh-Benjamin, 2000; Reder et al., 2009).Chapter 5: How Does Cognitive Ageing Affect Contextual Cuing?
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According to the associative deficit hypothesis, healthy older adults’ performance
decrements on certain memory tasks and not others depends on the extent to which
performance relies on creating and retrieving links between single units of information, and
requires integrity of the medial temporal lobe. Specifically, diminished working memory
capacity (e.g., Craik & Jennings, 1992; Hartman et al. 2001; Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, &
D’Esposito, 2000; Salthouse & Babcock, 1991; Zacks et al., 2000) and the atrophy of the
hippocampal system (Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004; Rosen, et al., 2003), both generally
accepted to occur with cognitive ageing, create the “binding” issues described in the
associative deficit hypothesis.
Successful contextual cuing essentially is a definitive measure of associative
binding. Evidence of contextual cuing can only occur after participants have formed an
association between the location of a target letter and the spatial context of the distracter
letters within a repeated configuration, and are subsequently able to retrieve this
relationship later on to guide visual search or generation during the explicit test. This,
coupled with the strong body of evidence corroborating hippocampal involvement in
contextual cuing (Greene et al., 2007; Chun & Phelps, 1999; Park et al., 2004; Ryan et al,
2000), provides a strong argument in favour of the associative deficit hypothesis as an
account of why the contextual cuing is susceptible to cognitive ageing. The findings of age-
related decrements in contextual cuing that were shown in this thesis need to be extended
further to incorporate possible scenarios in which learning is facilitated in the task. Based
on predictions of the associative binding hypothesis, this might be accomplished by
decreasing the complexity of the repeated configurations to facilitate encoding between the
contextual cues and the target locations during the detection task (i.e., decreasing the totalChapter 5: How Does Cognitive Ageing Affect Contextual Cuing?
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number of configurations within each block, or including displays containing fewer
distracters).
Findings in Negash et al. (2007) also cannot be ignored as a possible explanation for
the age-related decline of contextual cuing. Perhaps the age-related decrements in
contextual cuing found in Experiments 1, 3, and 4 coincided with a certain genetic
predisposition in those older adults. Some of the most robust findings of genetic
associations have been between certain ApoE alleles and Alzheimer’s disease. Principally
associated with protein that is involved in the transport of cholesterol, ApoE ε4 has been
shown to speed up the age of onset of Alzheimer’s disease because it hinders neuronal
repair mechanisms (McGue & Johnson, 2008). Though surprisingly, the link between
ApoE and normal memory decline to date has only been shown to occur in older adults
within the 50-70 year old age range (Bathum et al., 2006; Zhao et al., 2005), and has been
shown to be relatively weak (Christensen et al., 2004; Hofer et al., 2002; Wilson et al.,
2002). Undoubtedly, Negash et al.’s original result of a relationship between ApoE and
contextual cuing impairments should be extended further to address the specific
neurological consequences of being a carrier of this allele, and whether this genetic
influence is only asserted after a certain age, as previous experiments suggest.
5.5 Conclusions
The evidence presented in this thesis challenges the notion that older and younger
adults perform equivalently on implicit memory tasks, in particular the contextual cuing
task. It also became apparent that the behavioural impairments caused by cognitive ageing
cannot be explained based on consciousness of processing and slower processing speed.
Therefore, it seems necessary to shift conceptions of memory to a representation with theChapter 5: How Does Cognitive Ageing Affect Contextual Cuing?
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capability to resolve why reductions in cognitive functioning occur in ageing populations
and amnesic patients.
This thesis provides a strong body evidence to challenge previously accepted
theories of memory, most notably the infamous implicit-explicit memory distinction, so
that a clear and accurate portrayal of cognitive ageing can be obtained in the near future169
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